The Gap between Knowing the Meaning of a Word and Understanding It Brian Bowman
I sketch a graded picture of semantic competence (i.e.
how individual speakers understand meaning). Semantic competence ranges over
a gap between a very minimal level of competence and robust understanding. I
deny the traditional notion that competence can be characterized in terms of
knowing a semantic theory. A semantic theory for a language simply states,
for each expression in the language, what content it is associated with. But
there is much more to the notion of understanding an expression than
cognitively forging the correct expression-content association. For a word W
with content C, semantic theory will state that W means C. But knowing that
W means C doesn’t suffice to fully understand W. In fact, even the most
minimally competent speaker will know that W means C, and hence there is a
gap between knowing that W means C and fully understanding W. A robust
understanding of W requires knowing that W means C, and, further, knowing
things about C that are generally presupposed in conversational contexts
(and therefore generally required to be known in order to communicate
competently). While I do not deny that semantic competence is a species of
knowledge, I break from characterizing it in epistemic terms, opting instead
to characterize it in terms of abilities. In my view, semantic competence is
comprised of three distinct abilities which I call "referential competence,"
"recognitional competence," and "inferential competence." Roughly,
referential competence with a word W is the ability to use W with its
meaning (i.e. being able to use a name with its reference). Recognitional
competence with a word W has to do with our ability to recognize whether or
not W applies in a given circumstance. Inferential competence with a word W
has to do with our ability to recognize the inferential roles W plays.
Referential competence can in many cases be had without the other two
abilities. But mere referential competence is a very minimal ability that
constitutes a state of impaired understanding (sometimes severely so). Some
measure of recognitional or inferential competence is generally required in
order to have genuine, full-blooded understanding. So the gap between the
minimal level of competence and robust understanding can be characterized in
terms of the abilities as the gap between mere referential competence and a
richer level of understanding secured by the other two abilities.
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