The Gap between Knowing the Meaning of a Word and Understanding It

Brian Bowman
University of Southern California

I sketch a graded picture of semantic competence (i.e. how individual speakers understand meaning). Semantic competence ranges over a gap between a very minimal level of competence and robust understanding. I deny the traditional notion that competence can be characterized in terms of knowing a semantic theory. A semantic theory for a language simply states, for each expression in the language, what content it is associated with. But there is much more to the notion of understanding an expression than cognitively forging the correct expression-content association. For a word W with content C, semantic theory will state that W means C. But knowing that W means C doesn’t suffice to fully understand W. In fact, even the most minimally competent speaker will know that W means C, and hence there is a gap between knowing that W means C and fully understanding W. A robust understanding of W requires knowing that W means C, and, further, knowing things about C that are generally presupposed in conversational contexts (and therefore generally required to be known in order to communicate competently). While I do not deny that semantic competence is a species of knowledge, I break from characterizing it in epistemic terms, opting instead to characterize it in terms of abilities. In my view, semantic competence is comprised of three distinct abilities which I call "referential competence," "recognitional competence," and "inferential competence." Roughly, referential competence with a word W is the ability to use W with its meaning (i.e. being able to use a name with its reference). Recognitional competence with a word W has to do with our ability to recognize whether or not W applies in a given circumstance. Inferential competence with a word W has to do with our ability to recognize the inferential roles W plays. Referential competence can in many cases be had without the other two abilities. But mere referential competence is a very minimal ability that constitutes a state of impaired understanding (sometimes severely so). Some measure of recognitional or inferential competence is generally required in order to have genuine, full-blooded understanding. So the gap between the minimal level of competence and robust understanding can be characterized in terms of the abilities as the gap between mere referential competence and a richer level of understanding secured by the other two abilities.