I’ll defend a Frege-inspired picture concerning reference fixing. The picture is Fregean inasmuch as I endorse the view that on top of referring to an entity a singular term expresses a mode of presentation of that entity. The referent satisfies that mode of presentation. Unlike Frege, though, I don’t assume that modes of presentation enter the proposition expressed. The Frege-inspired picture I have in mind is thus consonant with the direct reference view that the propositional constituents are entities inhabiting the real world. We thus have Russellian propositions. The picture I defend is inspired by Perry’s distinction between reflexive content and referential content: an utterance of a simple sentence comes equipped with at least two semantic contents, it reflexive truth conditions and its referential ones. While the former classify the cognitive profile of the utterance (and as such it comes closed to Fregean senses), the latter gives us the referential profile of the utterance and determines the truth value of the utterance.