Indexicals, Context-Sensitivity, and the Failure of Implication Gillian Russell
By an implication barrier thesis I shall mean a claim which says that no set
containing only sentences of one kind entails a sentence of another kind,
for example, the claim that no set containing only descriptive sentences
entails a normative sentence, or the claim that no set containing only
particular sentences entails a universal one. The aim of the present paper
is to formulate and prove an indexical barrier theorem, according to which
(extremely roughly) no set containing only non-indexical sentences entails
an indexical sentence. Though a number of obstacles to the proof of such a
theorem exist, the thought that there is some non-trivial theorem to be
discovered is motivated by well-known thought experiments from the
philosophies of language and mind, such as those of Hector-Neri Casteneda,
John Perry and David Lewis. |