Direct Reference, Empty Names, and Church's Translation Argument Marco Santambrogio The fundamental thesis common to all
theories of direct reference is that the sole semantic function of a proper
name is to refer to an individual. It is generally assumed that, together
with the further thesis that sentences as used in appropriate contexts
express propositions, this thesis entails that the contribution made by a
proper name to the proposition expressed by any sentence where it occurs is
the individual bearing the name. From this, it follows that empty names have
nothing to contribute to propositions and then the view that sentences such
as ‘Vulcan is a planet’ express “gappy” or somehow defective propositions
seems to be virtually forced upon us. I intend to challenge the first step in this reasoning. From the fact
that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to an
individual, it does not follow that the individual referred to must occur in
the proposition expressed. I will show that at least one alternative exists,
fully compatible with direct reference. According to it, even empty names
have something to contribute to propositions. A comparison will be drawn between the resulting view of propositions and
two of the best theories of empty names presently available, namely David
Braun’s influential Gappy (or Unfilled) Proposition View and the
Metalinguistic View. I claim that the view I propose fares better than
Braun’s view with respect to at least two of the three main objections that
can be raised against it. It also avoids the most serious difficulties
confronting the Metalinguistic View. The whole issue involves more than just empty names. The view difended
here lends itself to some non-trivial developments reaching as far as the
semantics of belief ascriptions.
|