Direct Reference, Empty Names, and Church's Translation Argument

Marco Santambrogio
University of Parma

The fundamental thesis common to all theories of direct reference is that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to an individual. It is generally assumed that, together with the further thesis that sentences as used in appropriate contexts express propositions, this thesis entails that the contribution made by a proper name to the proposition expressed by any sentence where it occurs is the individual bearing the name. From this, it follows that empty names have nothing to contribute to propositions and then the view that sentences such as ‘Vulcan is a planet’ express “gappy” or somehow defective propositions seems to be virtually forced upon us.

 

I intend to challenge the first step in this reasoning. From the fact that the sole semantic function of a proper name is to refer to an individual, it does not follow that the individual referred to must occur in the proposition expressed. I will show that at least one alternative exists, fully compatible with direct reference. According to it, even empty names have something to contribute to propositions.

 

A comparison will be drawn between the resulting view of propositions and two of the best theories of empty names presently available, namely David Braun’s influential Gappy (or Unfilled) Proposition View and the Metalinguistic View. I claim that the view I propose fares better than Braun’s view with respect to at least two of the three main objections that can be raised against it. It also avoids the most serious difficulties confronting the Metalinguistic View.

 

The whole issue involves more than just empty names. The view difended here lends itself to some non-trivial developments reaching as far as the semantics of belief ascriptions.

 

FULL PAPER