Semantic Stipulation and Knowledge De Re

Joshua Spencer and Chris Tillman
Syracuse University and the University of Manitoba

We can introduce names by way of reference fixing descriptions.  If N is a name introduced by way of a reference fixing description F, then it seems we can assert and believe the propositions expressed by sentences of the form N is F.  Moreover, it also seems that we can come to know the proposition expressed by N is F simply by reflecting on the fact that the referent of N must satisfy F, given the method of introducing N.  However, that putative knowledge gained by way of such reflection involves objectionable epistemic shortcuts.  In this paper, we consider and object to various responses that have been given to this puzzle.  We then propose our own response which relies on the notion that some beliefs are informationally isolated (they cannot be used for any practical purpose for which it should be useful).  According to our proposal, beliefs that are gained by semantic stipulation are informationally isolated.  Moreover, those who assert informationally isolated beliefs are being conversationally misleading.  One might even hold that a necessary condition on a beliefs being knowledge is that the belief is not informationally isolated.