Semantic Stipulation and Knowledge De Re Joshua Spencer and Chris Tillman We can introduce
names by way of reference fixing descriptions. If N
is a name introduced by way of a reference fixing description F, then
it seems we can assert and believe the propositions expressed by sentences
of the form N is F. Moreover, it also seems that
we can come to know the proposition expressed by N is F simply by
reflecting on the fact that the referent of N must satisfy F,
given the method of introducing N. However, that
putative knowledge gained by way of such reflection involves objectionable
epistemic shortcuts. In this paper, we consider and
object to various responses that have been given to this puzzle.
We then propose our own response which relies on the notion that some
beliefs are informationally isolated (they cannot be used for any practical
purpose for which it should be useful). According to our
proposal, beliefs that are gained by semantic stipulation are
informationally isolated. Moreover, those who assert
informationally isolated beliefs are being conversationally misleading.
One might even hold that a necessary condition on a beliefs being
knowledge is that the belief is not informationally isolated.
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