Hobbes on Reason and Self-Preservation

Harry Silverstein
Washington State University

Bernard Gert has argued that reason, on Hobbes's view, "is not merely a method whereby each man attempts to harmonize or maximize his particular passions," but in addition "has an end of its own," namely, self-preservation. By contrast the standard, instrumentalist, interpretation holds that reason, for Hobbes, does not prescribe ultimate ends, but merely calculates correct choices for achieving the ends that one does in fact adopt. In this paper I defend the standard interpretation against Gert. Specifically, I argue that the standard interpretation (1) conforms better to Hobbes's actual claims concerning both reason and self-preservation; (2) makes better sense of Hobbes's account of the Laws of Nature; (3) provides a more plausible account of Hobbes's views concerning irrational acts and desires; and (4) provides an entirely acceptable account of Hobbes's "objectivist" moral theory. At the end of the paper I argue that, Hobbesian exegesis aside, the concept of "reason" which Gert's interpretation ascribes to Hobbes is intrinsically implausible.