Hume's Religious Skepticism

Joseph Keim Campbell
Washington State University

There are two distinct problems of evil: the logical problem, which proclaims that any amount of evil is incompatible with God's existence, and the natural problem, which claims that evil is inconsistent with natural theology. I argue that in the Dialogues the discussion of evil primarily functions as a sceptical rejoinder to Cleanthes's design argument, and that Philo--and thus Hume--holds a position similar to that of Sextus Empiricus. Seen in this light, Hume is not an atheist but a sceptic who claims that there is no more reason to accept theism than to reject it.

I also address two difficulties: Hume's well-known criticisms of Pyrrhonism, and the numerous comments he makes elsewhere which are at odds with a religious scepticism. I attempt to render an understanding of Hume's attitudes about scepticism and religion that solves these problems and is consistent with his overall philosophy.