Moral Sense and Wide-Responsibility

Paul Russell
University of British Columbia

Among the most influential compatilist strategies currently on offer in the free will debate is the view that issues of responsibility must be understood with reference to our natural (human) liability to moral sentiments or reactive attitudes. I call compatibilist strategies of this general kind naturalistic approaches to responsibility. Any plausible strategy of this kind, I argue, requires and adequate theory of moral capacity. Recent work in compatibilist literature--including the work of prominent naturalists--has placed particular emphasis on the importance of (deep) control for responsible agency. What is missing from these accounts of the capacities required of responsible agents, however, is any reference to the ability to experience and understand moral sentiment (i.e. moral sense). My primary objective in this paper is to argue that from the perspective of naturalistic approach, responsible agents must possess a capacity for moral sense. This claim, I will show, touches on matters of considerable importance for understanding and defending the naturalist's position.