Reason's Reasons

David Schmidtz
University of Arizona

This is a valid argument:

1. I know that A (an available course of action) would serve my end E.

2. Therefore, I have a reason to do A.

I will call this the Argument. To say the Argument is valid is to say it is truth-preserving; there are no cases where the premise is true but the conclusion is false. In short, the Argument has no counterexamples.

In what follows, I explain why the Argument is valid. Then I explain why it matters. Some say we do not have reasons (in particular, ends are not reasons) unless we have reasons for reasons, all the way down. My view is almost the opposite: if we are ever to have reasons for reasons, we must first of all have reasons. Our having ends is what gets us started.

I conclude by reflecting on the fact that humanly rational agency is an achievement, not a given. We are launched into humanly rational adulthood not by reasons for reasons all the way down but rather by instrumental reasoning in service of biologically given ends. One aspect of the achievement involved in becoming a humanly rational adult is making peace with the limits of what we can achieve. We become something more than purely instrumental reasoners, if all goes well, but we remain something less than beings with reasons all the way down.

Biographical Note:

David Schmidtz is Professor of Philosophy and joint Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona. His most recent book is Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, co-authored with Robert E. Goodin, published by Cambridge University Press in 1998.