Skepticism about Practical Reason: Transcendental Arguments and Their Limits

Jim Skidmore
University of Minnesota

As philosophers of practical reason continue to search for ways to defeat skepticism, more and more seem to be turning to a particularly controversial form of argument: the transcendental argument. For example, James Dreier has recently defended a principle of instrumental reason by way of such an argument. Christine Korsgaard goes further, attempting to provide a foundation for morality via transcendental argument. But transcendental arguments are controversial. In a famous 1968 paper, Barry Stroud develops what many have taken to be a decisive objection against them. In this paper, I argue that while Stroud's objection may be decisive against transcendental arguments in other areas, such arguments for principles of practical reason can escape it. Their scope, however, is strictly limited. While, as Dreier shows, they may well succeed in providing a foundation for instrumental reason, I argue that they cannot succeed in providing a rational foundation for morality.