Libertarian Openness, Blameworthiness, and Time
Ish Haji
According to the intuitively plausible thesis of retrospective blameworthiness
(“Blame Past”), one can be morally blameworthy only for actions that one has
already performed; blameworthiness is essentially retrospective. If this view is
true, then the thesis of prospective blameworthiness (“Blame Future”) that
one can, as of a time, be blameworthy for an action yet to be performed is
false. In this paper I first advance what I take to be one of the strongest
lines of support for Blame Past. I then utilize Frankfurt-type examples to cast
doubt on this line of support. Finally, I propose that a certain conception of
moral responsibility—roughly, the conception that when one is morally
responsible for an action, one discloses or expresses what one morally stands
for in relation to that action—provides motivation for Blame Future.