Ori Simchen, Yale University
Following the work of Putnam, Kripke, and Burge, it is now a commonplace that (a) the extension of a typical common noun is a crucial ingredient in the noun's overall semantic content, and that (b) extension is fixed both environmentally and socially. These points taken together imply that content-determination is sensitive both to speakers' physical environment and to the social interactions among them. In this paper I focus on the social dimension of content-determination. I consider two related questions: What is the extent of the phenomenon of linguistic deference (or 'division of linguistic labor')?, and What are the factors that determine whether a term in fact exhibits linguistic deference? I explore the role of trust in an expert-doctrine as the key to answering both questions. I then employ these results in casting doubt on recent claims in contemporary jurisprudence that just as we are beholden to botanical expertise for the content of 'elm' and to metallurgical expertise for the content of 'gold', so we are beholden to jurisprudential expertise for the content of 'law'. I argue that there are really no good reasons for thinking that a term such as 'law' exhibits linguistic deference, despite recent claims to the contrary.