Valentina M. Urbanek, Tufts University
John Rawls locates a flaw of utilitarianism in the fact that it "does not take seriously the distinction between persons" (TJ 24). In this paper, I wish to consider from where this objection derives force, focusing in particular on whether or not it derives force from a metaphysical picture of persons, i.e., a particular criterion of personal identity. I will try to show that the objection derives its force from a reasonable view of what is valuable, and not as a result of pitting one criterion of personal identity against another. Thus, utilitarians do nothing to defend their disregard for the distinction between persons by appealing to reductionism about persons. Instead, utilitarians must demonstrate how the moral weight of events and the irrelevance of their location in lives cohere with our beliefs about the kinds of persons we want to be and the kinds of lives we think are worth living.