Function, Malfunction, and Intentional Explanation
J. S. McIntosh
University of Western Ontario
Intentional explanations invoke intentional states (e.g., beliefs and desires). Your believing there is beer in the fridge and desiring one, explains your going to the fridge. You are successful in getting what you want because, in part, your belief was true. How do we account for the content of such states? That is, how do we give a naturalistic account of the individuation of intentional content? Some philosophers appeal to biological or teleological role. Biological function involves normativity—an item’s function need not be what it is doing, but rather what it should be doing. I dispute the current consensus about how to cash out such normativity naturalistically, without denying that there is a normative element to biological function. With a better understanding of biological function, I return to the question of how to individuate intentional states. I conclude that using biological function to get us what we want will not work, and that even if it did work, it would preclude us getting what we really want.