Alfred Mele
Florida State University
A trio of psychologists
recently described a 1983 article by Benjamin Libet and colleagues as “one of
the most philosophically challenging papers in modern scientific psychology.”
The most striking thesis in that 1983 article is that “the brain . . .
‘decides’ to initiate or, at the least, prepare to initiate [certain
actions] at a time before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such
a decision has taken place.” Libet
and others contend that this thesis and some related claims have important
implications for free will. Drawing
on a 1997 article of mine, I argue that the data reported in the 1983 article
and in subsequent work by Libet and various coauthors fall well short of
justifying his thesis. I also argue
that although Libet’s work has some bearing on free will, what is interesting
about his work in that connection has been seriously misidentified.