Virtue and Character in Reliabilism

Jason S. Baehr
Loyola Marymount University

Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two divergent camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists tend to think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities like memory, introspection, vision, and reason. Virtue responsibilists, by contrast, conceive of intellectual virtues as good intellectual character traits like inquisitiveness, fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, and intellectual courage. I argue that virtue reliabilists – and reliabilists generally – must give serious consideration to the character virtues that interest virtue responsibilists. I explain why a failure to do so leaves them unable to adequately account for varieties of knowledge that are among the most valued and sought after by human beings. The argument has implications for reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, the distinction between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, and the overall structure of virtue epistemology.