The KK Thesis, Zombies and Skepticism

Sven Bernecker

University of Manchester

Firstly I develop an objection to (a version of) the KK thesis (i.e, the thesis that knowing implies knowing that one knows) by arguing that it conflicts with externalist representationalism (i.e., the view that mental contents depend on causal connections between internal states and external affairs). Given externalist representationalism, for all I know a priori, my so-called knowledge states may be states devoid of mental content. Therefore, externalist representationalism implies that I cannot know that I know in the sense that I cannot tell, on the basis of reflection, that I am not a zombie incapable of knowledge states (a priori KK thesis). Secondly, I argue that brain-in-a-vat-style anti-skeptical arguments from externalism are incoherent, for they tacitly assume the truth of the a priori KK thesis. Thirdly, I argue that the real anti-skeptical impact of externalism consists in its denial of the a priori KK thesis.