Irrationality and Cognition
John Pollock
University of Arizona
The strategy of this paper is to throw light on rational cognition and
epistemic justification by examining irrationality. I argue that practical
irrationality derives from a general difficulty we have in overriding
conditioned features likings. Epistemic irrationality is possible because we
are reflexive cognizers, able to reason about redirect some aspects of our
own cognition. This has the consequence that practical irrationality can
affect our epistemic cognition. The upshot is that one cannot give a theory
of epistemic rationality or epistemic justification without simultaneously
giving a theory of practical rationality.
A consequence of this account is that a
theory of rationality is a descriptive theory, describing contingent features
of a cognitive architecture, and it forms the core of a general theory of
"deliberate" cognition - those aspects of cognition that are under
voluntary control. It also follows that most of the so-called "rules for
rationality" that philosophers have proposed are really just rules
describing default (non-reflexive) cognition. It can be perfectly rational
for a reflexive cognizer to break these rules.
The "normativity" of
rationality is a reflection of a built-in feature of reflexive cognition -
when we detect violations of rationality, we have a tendency to desire to
correct them. This is just another part of the descriptive theory of
rationality.
Although theories of rationality are descriptive, the structure of reflexive
cognition gives philosophers, as human cognizers, privileged access to certain
aspects of rational cognition. Philosophical theories of rationality are
really scientific theories, based on inference to the best explanation, that
take contingent introspective data as the evidence to be explained.
The full paper is available at:
http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/Irrationality.pdf
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