Contextualism in
Epistemology and the Context Sensitivity of ‘Knows’ Robert J. Stainton I argue for a complex conditional, namely if there are
pragmatic determinants of what is asserted, and if contextualism can overcome
other problems not having to do with the context sensititivity of the word
'know', then the spirit of contextualism can be saved even if 'know' isn't
really a context sensitive word. To support this conclusion, I first lay out
the "letter" of contextualism and three aims that make up its
"spirit". Then, in passing, I rehearse familiar reasons for thinking
that 'know' doesn't behave like ordinary context sensitive words. I then
suggest, however, that the "letter" can be read in two ways, and
that one of them doesn't actually require 'know' to be, as a matter of its
standing semantics, a context sensitive expression. This variant on the
"letter" only requires that the literal content of speech acts
attributing knowledge be variable, which is a rather different thing -- if
there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted. I next argue that there
are such determinants, and try to show how the "spirit" of
contextualism might be salvaged as a result. |