Contextualism in Epistemology and the Context Sensitivity of ‘Knows’

 

Robert J. Stainton

Carleton University

 

I argue for a complex conditional, namely if there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted, and if contextualism can overcome other problems not having to do with the context sensititivity of the word 'know', then the spirit of contextualism can be saved even if 'know' isn't really a context sensitive word. To support this conclusion, I first lay out the "letter" of contextualism and three aims that make up its "spirit". Then, in passing, I rehearse familiar reasons for thinking that 'know' doesn't behave like ordinary context sensitive words. I then suggest, however, that the "letter" can be read in two ways, and that one of them doesn't actually require 'know' to be, as a matter of its standing semantics, a context sensitive expression. This variant on the "letter" only requires that the literal content of speech acts attributing knowledge be variable, which is a rather different thing -- if there are pragmatic determinants of what is asserted. I next argue that there are such determinants, and try to show how the "spirit" of contextualism might be salvaged as a result.