Reconciling Lonergan’s and Levinas’ View of Skepticism

Slawomir Szkredka

Loyola Marymount University

Bernard Lonergan claims that his theory of knowing as an ordered set of related operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging cannot be revised and in this way it constitutes the ultimate refutation of skepticism. For Emmanuel Levinas, on the other hand, skepticism constantly accompanies the production of philosophy. It is invited by philosophy; it “is refutable, but it returns.” Has skepticism therefore been refuted once and for all, as Lonergan claims, or is skepticism always to return, as Levinas suggests? Can these two different approaches to skepticism be reconciled?

With Levinasian cognitional theory set against a comprehensive Lonerganian account of knowledge I shall indicate the irrefutable elements of the former and defend them against skepticism using the explanatory power of the latter. In conclusion, I shall prove that what Levinas means by skepticism, Lonergan would call “further relevant questions” or “doubt”.