Flores's summary.
Alcoff, Linda. "Cultural Feminism versus Poststructuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory." Signs 13.3 (1988): 405-36.
Concept of woman is problematic because it invokes the limit, contrasting Other,
or mediated self-reflection of patriarchal culture. Woman is overdetermined,
always an Object to be defined by men who are underdetermined, supposedly free
to define themselves.
Cultural feminists respond to this by redefining women according to their present
activities and attributes, construing passivity as peacefulness etc (407) but
not challenging the defining of women per se.
Poststructuralist (French) feminists reject the possibility of defining women
at all, arguing that the politics of gender or sexual difference must be replaced
with a plurality of difference where gender loses its position of significance
(407).
Alcoff feels both positions are inadequate.
Cultural feminism is the ideology of a female nature or female essence reappropriated
by feminists themselves in an effort to revalidate undervalued female attributes.
Mary Daly, for example, finds sexual difference essential to explaining how
men's fear of and desire to dominate female creative energy. Adrienne Rich also
links female consciousness to the female body and identifies patriarchy as the
subjugation of female creativity (409-10).
Alice Echols coined the term cultural feminism to describe its essentializing
tendencies and promotion of a female counterculture (411). If gender differences
are innate, then the cultural feminists focus on an alternative feminist culure
is politically correct. Alcoff feels feminists of oppressed nationalities or
races (e.g., Cherrie Moraga, Audre Lorde) tend not to essentialize women or
position maleness wholly as Other, seeing both as very problematic (412).
One must acknowledge that the innateness of gender differences in personality
and character is at this point factually and philosophically indefensible (413).
Though we can applaud feminist peace activists, they may be reproducing dominant
cultural assumptions about female maternal love and nurturing powers, promoting
unrealistic expectations that many women cannot satisfy (413). This does not
mean the political effects of cultural feminism have been all negative. But
while promoting positive attributes we should not promote the restrictive conditions
that gave rise to those attributes (414). Cultural feminists fail to criticize
the construction of the subject by a discourse that weaves knowledge and power
into a coercive structure that constrains individuals to certain idenitities.
Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault argue that the humanist subject believed to be
discoverable beneath ideology is in reality a construct of that very humanist
discourse (415). No repression of some essential identity in the humanist sense.
But there is a neodeterminism in arguing that we are overdetermined or constructed
by social discourse and cultural practice (415-16). Such macro forces are unpredictable;
individual autonomy and intentionality is nonexistent.
Alcoff disagrees with this erasure of any room for the individual to maneuver
within social discourse or to reflect effectively on such discourse or to challenge
its determinations (417). Applied to woman the post-structuralist's view is
nominalistic, designating woman as a fiction that must be dismantled. Via Derrida,
woman is a rupture in logocentrism who must avoid demarcation in order to hope
to defeat logocentrism and its oppressive power by asserting total difference
(417).
Foucault also rejects all constructions of oppositional subjects as mirror images
that recreate the discourse of power. But Alcoff believes such deconstruction
leaves room only for a negative feminism that refuses to construct anything
(e.g., Kristeva). Post-structuralism, however, is attractive because it promises
the freeplay of a plurality of differences unhampered by predetermined gender
identity and it is able to analyze how the subject is constructed through social
discourse. But how can one mobilize people without a positive alternative and
should feminism adopt an approach that threatens to deconstruct the female subject
and feminism itself?(419) Is undecidability of identity a model from which feminists
should learn?
Alcoff thinks not. Feminists need to have misogny validated rather than rendered
undecidable (e.g., Derrida's reading of Nietzsche). A nominalist position on
subjectivity de-genders analysis, making a feminist politics problematic. Post-structuralism
thus undercuts ability to oppose the mainstream insistence on universalizable,
apolitical methodology that ignores particularities, levelling individuals on
either basis of social constructionism or classical liberalism (420). Justice
and truth go out the window because race, class, and gender are constructs and
therefore incapable of validating such conceptions (420-21). [Alcoff seems slippery
here in saying that such positions posit that underneath we are all the same).
Might we not alternatively explore woman's experience of subjectivity without
such reductions or dilemmas?
Teresa de Lauretis tackles the problem of how to position oneself outside an
oppressive discourse by displacing oneself deviously within it, the problem
of feminist discourse that seems both excluded from discourse and imprisoned
within it. Not a problem of making the invisible visible, as if the essence
of gender were out there waiting to be recognized by the dominant discourse
(423). [Similar to making the silent speak?] De Lauretis summarizes the problem:
de-gendering the subject commits us to a generic subject that undercuts feminism;
gendering the subject articulates female subjectivity in a space distinct from
male subjectivity catching us up in an oppositional dichotomy controlled by
a misogynist discourse. A gender-bound subjectivity leads to essentializing
the male/female opposition as universal and ahistorical (424).
In Alice Doesn't Lauretis argues that subjectivity is defined by experience,
the complex of habits resulting from the engagement of a self in social reality.
Lauretis sees a way out through political, theoretical, self-analyzing practice
(424-25, [hazy assertion]). Lauretis later argues that consciousness is never
fixed because discursive boundaries change with historical conditions. What
emerges is multiple and shifting but Lauretis gives agency to the individual
while placing her within particular discursive formations.
Denise Riley also argues against biological and cultural determinism in War
in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother, in which she notes the
need for avoiding denying sexual difference (nominalism) and essentializing
it. Alcoff likes the way Riley problematizes her key concepts throughout her
study. Riley and Alcoff also note difficulty of defining individual needs either
by the individual or by external agents. Yet needs exist and responding to them
shouldn't commit one to essentialism (e.g. child care example), though this
is a risk (427). Political action shouldn't be avoided because women's needs
are problematic or perceived as non-universal.
Alcoff does not reject metaphysics, arguing that it is an attempt to reason
through ontological issues that cannot be decided empirically (429). Alcoff
rejects psychoanalytic approaches very cursorily (430). Lauretis argues that
language is not the sole locus/source of meaning, that habits and practices
are crucial in the construction of meaning and of gender in history. Somehow
habits are both concrete and fluid (431). Fluid because historical, subject
to change--thus our conclusions are contingent and revisable (431).
Alcoff also supports an identity politics, wherein one's identity is taken as
a political point of departure, a motivation for action. One's identity is always
a construction yet also a necessary point of departure (432). One chooses an
identity as a political point of departure. Identity politics rejects disinterested
rationality, siding with Marxist class analysis in its emphasis on materialism--one
must acknowledge a fleshy, material identity to make political claims. Gender
is now seen as a position from which to act politically (433).
Woman defined as a particular position with emphasis on the external context
in which the person is situated. This position is relative to its shifting context
or network of relations yet not undecidable (433-34).