Sources of Knowledge (Bernecker & Dretske, 431)

- **Perception:** Includes *proprioception:* bodily awareness
- **Introspection:** A form of *perception*? (Locke: reflection; Hume: inward sentiment)
- **Testimony:** A source of knowledge, or a species of *inferential knowledge*?
- **Memory:** A source of knowledge, or merely the *retention* of knowledge?
- **Reason:** Is a priori knowledge – knowable prior to experience – possible?
- **Inference:** Not a source of knowledge (but see the problem of induction, below)

Theories of Perception (431)

- **Direct Realism** (or Naïve Realism)
  - External objects (chairs, trees, etc.) are the direct objects of perception.
- **Indirect Realism** (or Representative Realism)
  - External objects are the *indirect* objects of perception.
  - Ideas (or sense data) are the direct objects of perception; ideas are caused by and represent external objects.
    - Some indirect realists believe that our ideas *resemble* the primary *qualities* of objects (extension, shape, motion, etc.) but not the secondary *qualities* of objects (color, taste, warmth, etc.)
- **Idealism** (or Phenomenalism)
  - Ideas are the direct objects of perception; there are no external objects; ordinary objects (chairs, trees, etc.) are nothing more than bundles of ideas.

Two Arguments for Indirect Realism (432)

- **Time-lag Argument**
- **Argument from Illusion**

An Argument Against Indirect Realism? (431-2)

- **Skepticism** is the view that no one knows anything.
- Some philosophers believe that indirect realism leads to skepticism or idealism. If I’m only directly acquainted with my ideas, how do I know that external objects resemble my ideas of them? How do I even know that they exist?
- In as much as skepticism is a problem, it is a problem for direct realism (and idealism), as well. For awareness of an object does not imply knowledge about it.

**Introspection:** the attention the mind gives to itself and its operations (433-4)

- Descartes: introspection is *infallible* and *omniscient*
- If you believe you’re in pain, you’re in pain; if you’re in pain, you know you are.
- Even if Descartes was wrong, it seems that introspection provides us with a kind of *epistemic authority:* first-person authority or privileged self-knowledge
- Two theories of epistemic authority:
  - **Detectivism:** our epistemic authority is due to a special *cognitive mechanism*


- **Constitutionism**: our mental states partly constitute our judgments about them

**Introspection, cont.**

- **Semantic Externalism**: “the view that the contents of many of our thoughts are determined at least in part by the states of the outside world” (434)
  - **Response to skepticism**: there is no possibility of massive error; thus, we cannot be brains-in-vats or enslaved bodies in the Matrix world
  - **Content Skepticism**: no one knows anything about the contents of their beliefs, e.g., that we *think* we are not brains-in-vats
  - Three responses to content skepticism (434)

**Memory and Testimony (434-5)**

- Is memory a *source* of knowledge, or does memory just retain or preserve what was previously known? Can memory *produce* new knowledge?
  - Memory belief vs. knowledge: the window argument (434)
- **Factual Memory**: remembering *that* (vs. remembering *how*)
  - Personal (vs. impersonal)
    - Non-inferential (vs. inferential)
      - **Episodic Memory**: memory of an experience, not just *that*
- 3 components of memory (435)
- Is testimony a species of *inferential* knowledge?
  - **Inferential**: She said that *p*; she is reliable; therefore, *p* is probably true.
  - Reid: memory is basic (non-inferential); usually we believe what people tell us

**Deduction vs. Induction (436-7)**

- **Truth preserving**: can’t infer falsity from truth   
  - Not truth preserving; underdetermined
- **Not ampliative**
  - **Ampliative**: informative
- **Erosion proof**: new premises can’t alter validity   
  - Not erosion proof
- **Problem of Induction**: How is inductive inference justified?
  - Induction cannot be justified by purely deductive (*demonstrative*) reasoning.
  - It would be circular to say that it was justified via inductive (*moral*) reasoning.

**Distinctions Between Propositions (cf. 437-8)**

- **Semantic Distinction**: What *makes* a proposition true?
  - A proposition is **analytic** iff its truth-value is solely a function of its grammatical structure (*syntax*) and the meaning of the words that comprise it (*semantics*)
  - A proposition is **synthetic** iff it is not analytic; thus (arguably) it is true in part because it corresponds with the facts and thus is informative or ampliative
- **Epistemological Distinction**: How can the proposition be **known**?
  - A proposition is **a priori** iff it is knowable prior to any experience
  - A proposition is **a posteriori** iff it is only knowable by experience
- **Metaphysical Distinction**: How is the proposition related to its truth-value?
  - A proposition is **necessary** iff its true-value could not have been otherwise
  - A proposition is **contingent** iff its truth-value could have been otherwise
- Hume: Every true proposition is either a **relation of ideas** (a priori, analytic, and necessary) or a **matter of fact** (a posteriori, synthetic, and contingent).
• Kant: All a priori propositions are necessary; some propositions are **synthetic a priori**
• Kripke: There are **contingent a priori** and **necessary a posteriori** propositions
• Kitcher: A reliabilist theory of a priori knowledge