QUESTIONS OF MILINDA

Nagasena mastered the Vedas (earliest Hindu scripture) as a child but later the boy declared:

"Empty are three Vedas and as chaff. There is in them neither reality, worth nor essential truth."

He then turned to Buddhism and memorized the canon in three months and understood its meaning in another three. He then mastered the Abhidhamma in one sitting!

Meander (Pali: Milinda) was a Bactrian King (125-95 BCE), whose impressions have been found on Greek coins. He learned some Indian languages and was known as a great disputant or dialectician. He was generally disappointed with Buddhist philosophers until he met Nagasena.

Scholastic Way (Panditavada) vs. Royal Way (Rajavada). (See Ikeda, p. 65.) The king decides on the former (to argue it out) rather than just take one's authority. The Scholastic Way: "When scholars talk a matter over one with another then is there a winding up, an unravelling; one or the other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake; distinctions are drawn, and contra-distinctions; and yet thereby they are not angered." (2.1.3 Sacred Books of the East (SBE) trans., p. 46).

The scene for the debate: five hundred Bactrian Greeks and eighty thousand monks.

Note: Technical Buddhist terms are in Pali, the language in which this dialogue was written.

Note: Unlike Socrates: mutual interrogation here, but only for a while.

Mil: What is your name?

Nag: It is only a convention, and no [permanent] individual exists behind it.

Mil: Who then does all your acts? Who is responsible for Karma?

Nag: Are any of the parts of my body my self? No. Are any of the skandhas my self? No. Is my self the sum total of the skandhas? No.

Is Nagasena nothing but a sound?! Extreme Nominalism from Latin nomen (name). Not the famous medieval nominalist William of Ockham, but his obscure predecessors such as Roscelin (ca. 1050-1120 CE). Roscelin’s position on the Trinity was that since we use three different names for each person of the Trinity, there then must be three gods. Roscelin was forced to repudiate these teachings at the Council of Soissons in 1093.

Nagasena then uses the metaphor of the chariot. It is not any one of its parts, neither the sum of its parts, or anything other than the sum. "Chariot" is nothing but a sound, too.

Nag: How did you arrive here, dear King?

Mil: Because of the parts being connected in a certain way, the name "chariot" came into use.

Nag: Because of the arrangement of the parts of my being, the name "Nagasena" came into use.

In neither case is there a permanent individual "essence" chariot or Nagasena.

A nun's poem (p. 93)--a very significant fact.

For just as for an assemblage of parts

The term "chariot" is employed,

So, when the Aggregates [skandhas] are present,

The expression "living being" (jiva) is employed

(Samyutta Nikaya 5.10.6)

We might say that the argument here has shifted to a bundle theory of the self rather than nominalism, but one might object that Nagasena is still speaking linguistically not metaphysically. The nun says "expression" of jiva not a real individual.

Gilbert Ryle and the "Category Mistake" in his book The Concept of Mind (1953).

Greek either/or dialectic meets Buddhist neither/nor (p. 94). Read dialectic essay on web.

Section Title: There is No Continuous Personal Identity

Isn’t this misleading on the part of our editor? Shouldn’t it read: No continuous substantial identity?

Mil: Is the person who is reborn the same person or different (i.e. either/or)?

Nag: She is neither the same nor different (i.e., neither/nor dialectic). Example of Embryo and Child and Mother--we are all changing in every moment.

p.. 95 (top): But there is a continuous thread "solely because of dependence on this body, all these are embraced in one."

Example of Lamp and Flame--Flame is different, but the lamp remains the same? Lamp is like the five skandhas? "Uninterrupted succession of mental and physical states (nama-rupa)." The changing "person"--the "flame" of the nama-rupa--is neither the same nor different. The best description of personal identity?

The Example of Milk and Butter--Fresh milk->sour milk->fresh butter->clarified butter (ghee).

One would be mistaken to say it is the same, but also mistaken to say that it is different. Therefore, neither the same, nor different is the best way to describe the continuing person. Neither/nor dialectic again.

Chain of causation is the basis for moral responsibility--"They who know causation know the Dharma." Or: They who know causation (as interdependent coorigination) know their Dharma-karma. That is, they know not only what to do, but also what their karma is.

FIRE IN THE FIELD

"The fire I failed to put out is one thing, and the fire that set fire to this man's field is another; I am not guilty."

Different nama-rupa but karma is carried over with full moral effect.

99: "Although one nama-rupa comes to an end at death, and another nama-rupa comes into existence at rebirth, nevertheless the second comes straight from the first. Therefore, the man is not released from his evil deeds."

 WHAT IS REBORN? (p. 96)

Nama-rupa is reborn, but not the same nama-rupa. One person does the karma, another person is reborn because of it.

Hindus--same unchanging, eternal soul, different persons. But how can a pure soul carry impure karma? If karma is always changing, then it must be carried on the changing soul--the phenomenal self or jiva.

Mil: Does that mean that the first person is released from his evil karma?

Nag.: No. (But in a sense, Yes? The previous person really doesn't exist any more.)

METAPHOR OF THE MANGOES

The mango thief who, as a defense, claims that the mangoes the man planted are not the ones that he took. But that's absurd because the "last mango came from the first." Direct chain of causation by which karma is carried on nama-rupa.

 WHAT IS NAMA-RUPA?

Nama is the "fine" mental constituents form of the skandhas: feeling, perception, disposition, and consciousness. Rupa is the "gross and coarse" physical constituent.

Mil: Why isn't just nama reborn?

Nag: Because nama and rupa are dependent on each other.

But later we read about form-less gods (arupa deva = no body god) (p. 113). And inanimate objects presumably would have no nama, but just rupa? And we have seen that the higher jhanas are also arupa. Three basic exceptions to a basic Buddhist doctrine? Recall that Nagasena states that Nama and Rupa "invariably come into existence together."

Nagasena's Answer to the King's question about transmigration (Sacred Books of the East (SBE), trans. p. 111): it's like lighting one lamp from another. It requires no transmigration. Is it the same flame? Neither the same flame, nor different; nor the same body, nor different.

A candle analogy is even better. For the enlightened person one’s "wax" gets smaller in each cycle and finally one, as in the case of the Buddha, sees that one has enough for one last life. The sinful person, on the other hand, gains more wax in each cycle. The flame in each case represents the continuous personal identity that remains the same throughout all the cycles, even though the name changes in each cycle. Also, the extinguishing of the flame fits one meaning of the word Nirvana.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE BUDDHA?

SBE, p. 113: No Karma remained or no craving remained to form a new individual. Simile: It's like asking where the flame went when a fire goes out. The candle also burns down completely. Flame (fire) symbolizing craving.

ON THE BEGINNING OF TIME

Back to Stryk, 100: Analogies of seed and fruit, hen and egg and the circle. It is a question which does not tend to edification. Time neither has a beginning nor doesn't have a beginning. Most Greek philosophers simply said it didn't have a beginning. Neither/nor dialectic essentially shuts down thinking and talk about a subject.

 NO CREATION OUT OF NOTHING

Numerous examples to show that something always comes out of, or is dependent, on something else: 12-fold chain of causation. Judeo-Christian-Islamic God--eternal substance independent from everything, creating out of absolute nothing.

THE DOORS OF PERCEPTION

104: Is there a soul behind the senses and in control of them?

With the eyes the soul sees visible objects; with the nose the soul smells objects

With the ears the soul hears sounds; with the mind the soul perceives concepts (the meaning of dhamma in this context)

With the tongue the soul tastes flavors; with the body the soul touches things.

Nagasena's First Response: Does the soul "see" with ears, nose, tongue, and body? Obviously not. Can the soul "hear" with the eyes?

The implication seems to be that for the soul to "look" out the doors of perception it would have to have a faculty of sight, hearing, touch, etc; but that would lead to an infinite regress of souls helping souls helping souls to look out the doors of perception. This, however, is not implied in Nagasena’s queries. What seems to be implied (in the later story of Dinna) is that the soul, if it were a super sense organ, would be totally confused about experience. In other words, it would not be able to see, hear, taste, smell, and touch all at the same time.

105: If Nagasena means that the palace door analogy is a bad one, he does have a point. We see things clearly out doors, but not out the "doors" of the senses.

Nagasena's Third Response: Dinna outside the door and then inside analogous to a flavor first perceived by the tongue and then being passed into the stomach. In Dinna's case we would perceive him inside as well as out, but the stomach (analogous to the soul?) would not perceive the flavor inside.

The point seems to be that Dinna outside perception would be different from Dinna inside perception, which the King should accept as true within his sensations/perception as distinct model. The world as it appears to us through perception is indeed different from the world in itself.

Nagasena's Fourth Response: Man in a trough of honey. If his lips were sealed, would he know where he was? Of course! He could see and feel it!

Mil: "I am no match for you in argument." Buddhist aporia--(Greek a + porus): no way out, dialectical dead-end. Same dramatic point in dialogue as in the Platonic dialogues. Why does the King give up here, especially in light of Nagasena's weak arguments? Is the door analogy completely irretrievable? The king gets a "second wind" on p. 109.

Nagasena discourses on the Abhidharma, the philosophical discourse on the sutras found in the Pali scripture. No dialectic here; just straight discourse. The King does ask for the straight "scoop" or truth.

Is Nagasena correct that all one needs is the sense organ and an object to produce senses of sight, sound, small, etc? No organizing mind or soul is necessary?  But doesn't mano provide this?  Here is an explanation: "[mano] synthesizes the results of the other five [faculties].  It develops concepts, thoughts and ideas from a hodgepodge of sensory data and. . . provides the basis for mental awareness" (M. Seelawimla and A. McKinley, "Sati [Mindfulness] and the Structure of the Mind in Early Buddhism," Pacific World 3 [Fall, 1987], p. 6).

107: Mind as a separate sense object of thought and mental causation. What is "vitality"? Is this chain of causation leading back to focussed perception and attention complete? Is there anything left out?

Hilarious Section on Denizens of Hell (p. 107).

WHAT IS NIRVANA?

Nagasena gives straight either/or answer: Nirvana is "unalloyed bliss." Perhaps this makes sense if one is talking about Nirvana while alive, because this experience could be verified. But a neither/nor answer would be the only appropriate answer for Nirvana without substrate, i.e., without the five skandas. Nirvana here would be simply be total freedom and release.

King is on the rebound; he is more feisty in the debate. Long discourse on the pain of reaching Nirvana.

Nagasena: But this is only the realization of Nirvana not Nirvana itself. It's like the bliss of sovereignty or the bliss of knowledge. In all three pain is involved.

Nirvana is formless like the ocean and like the formless gods. No reasoning or method will get at its nature. Highly figurative qualities of Nirvana (pp. 114-117). Zen-like, Koan-like. Only poetry will touch its nature.

115: Nirvana is the abode of mighty beings, saints? How can this be? Especially, if Nirvana is not a place (p. 122).

118: Nirvana described in neither/nor terms: "Nirvana is neither past nor future nor present; it is neither produced nor not produced."

King: Doesn't the saint in some way produce Nirvana?

Nagasena: No, he "neither realizes something which is already produced, nor first produces and then realizes it."

The King objects to the neither/nor dialectic, charging that it obscures the issues. Give me a straight either/or answer! OK, says Nagasena, Nirvana is freedom from trouble, etc.

119: Simile of escaping from the fire is like escaping from the three-fold fire of craving (for eternal existence, for temporal happiness, and for sensual pleasures).

Nirvana is not produced; it is simply realized as the negation of craving. Other similar "escapes."

120: "Ordering one's walk aright." What does that mean?

Nagasena: Getting rid of attachment and craving. Some similes to explain this.

122: Nirvana is not a place. How can it be an "abode of the saints?" Or is that just a figure of speech?

123: Where is the fire before it is kindled and where is it after the fire is out? Where is the fire located? So it is with Nirvana.

124: One must stand on Dharma (Morality?) in order to reach Nirvana. If you want a place for Nirvana, then there is your "place."

King: "I agree absolutely!"

HOW DO WE KNOW THAT THE BUDDHA EVER EXISTED?

If you or your teachers never saw the Buddha, how do you know that he ever existed?

Great kings of old? Source of the River Ganges? Builder of a great city?

126: Buddha as the all-seeing and all-knowing One. His teaching is for both humans and gods. NB: Buddha as savior: he ferried a multitude over the "Ocean of Rebirth."

128-131: Figurative language describing the Buddha