

GANs for
AML

Shoukun Sun

Introduction
of GANs

Basic
Variants

GANs in AML

Attack Through
GANs

Defense Through
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October 28, 2020

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Generative Modeling

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- Question: can we build a model to approximate a data distribution?
- Formally we are given $x \sim p_{data}(x)$ and a finite sample from this distribution

$$X = \{x | x \sim p_{data}(x)\}, |X| = n$$

- Problem: can we find a model such that

$$p_{model}(x; \theta) \approx p_{data}(x)$$

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Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) is a framework for estimating generative models via an adversarial process. This process simultaneously train two models:

- a generative model G that captures the data distribution;
- a discriminative model D that judges if a sample comes from training data rather than G .

These two model contest with each other in the zero-sum game.

Training GANs

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
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Algorithm 1 Minibatch stochastic gradient descent training of generative adversarial nets. The number of steps to apply to the discriminator, k , is a hyperparameter. We used $k = 1$, the least expensive option, in our experiments.

for number of training iterations **do**

for k steps **do**

- Sample minibatch of m noise samples $\{\mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{(m)}\}$ from noise prior $p_g(\mathbf{z})$.
- Sample minibatch of m examples $\{\mathbf{x}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{x}^{(m)}\}$ from data generating distribution $p_{\text{data}}(\mathbf{x})$.
- Update the discriminator by ascending its stochastic gradient:

$$\nabla_{\theta_d} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m \left[\log D(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}) + \log \left(1 - D(G(\mathbf{z}^{(i)})) \right) \right].$$

end for

- Sample minibatch of m noise samples $\{\mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{(m)}\}$ from noise prior $p_g(\mathbf{z})$.
- Update the generator by descending its stochastic gradient:

$$\nabla_{\theta_g} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m \log \left(1 - D(G(\mathbf{z}^{(i)})) \right).$$

end for

The gradient-based updates can use any standard gradient-based learning rule. We used momentum in our experiments.

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

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Examples

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
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
a)



b)



c)



d)

The application of GANs is not limited to images, but can also be extended to text and music.

Challenges of Training GANs

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- **Vanishing Gradient**
If the D is too good, G training can fail due to vanishing gradients.
- **Mode Collapse**
The generator produces the same output (or a small set of outputs).
- **Failure to Converge**
GANs frequently fail to converge as its complexity.



Figure: Mode Collapse

Pix2pix

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


Figure: Pix2pix process




Figure: Generator

Pix2pix Examples

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
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Online demo: <https://affinelayer.com/pixsrv/>

Conditional GAN

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

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Conditional GAN Architecture

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

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Conditional GAN Application

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
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StyleGAN

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
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
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
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(a) Traditional



(b) Style-based generator

AdvGAN

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- Title: Generating Adversarial Examples with Adversarial Networks.
- Semi-whitebox;black-box
Semi-whitebox: once the generator is trained, it can generate perturbations efficiently for any instance, no need to access the classifier.
- Time consuming while training; efficiently while generating perturbations.

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
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	FGSM	Opt.	Trans.	AdvGAN
Run time	0.06s	>3h	-	<0.01s
Targeted Attack	✓	✓	Ens.	✓
Black-box Attack			✓	✓

Table 1: Comparison with the state-of-the-art attack methods. Run time is measured for generating 1,000 adversarial instances during test time. Opt. represents the optimization based method, and Trans. denotes black-box attacks based on transferability.

Model	MNIST(%)			CIFAR-10(%)	
	A	B	C	ResNet	Wide ResNet
Accuracy (p)	99.0	99.2	99.1	92.4	95.0
Attack Success Rate (w)	97.9	97.1	98.3	94.7	99.3
Attack Success Rate (b-D)	93.4	90.1	94.0	78.5	81.8
Attack Success Rate (b-S)	30.7	66.6	87.3	10.3	13.3

Table 2: Accuracy of different models on pristine data, and the attack success rate of adversarial examples generated against different models by AdvGAN on MNIST and CIFAR-10. p: pristine test data; w: semi-whitebox attack; b-D: black-box attack with dynamic distillation strategy; b-S: black-box attack with static distillation strategy.

Data	Model	Defense	FGSM	Opt.	AdvGAN
M N I S T	A	Adv.	4.3%	4.6%	8.0%
		Ens.	1.6%	4.2%	6.3%
		Iter.Adv.	4.4%	2.96%	5.6%
	B	Adv.	6.0%	4.5%	7.2%
		Ens.	2.7%	3.18%	5.8%
		Iter.Adv.	9.0%	3.0%	6.6%
	C	Adv.	2.7%	2.95%	18.7%
		Ens.	1.6%	2.2%	13.5%
		Iter.Adv.	1.6%	1.9%	12.6%
C I F A R 10	ResNet	Adv.	13.10%	11.9%	16.03%
		Ens.	10.00%	10.3%	14.32%
		Iter.Adv.	22.8%	21.4%	29.47%
	Wide ResNet	Adv.	5.04%	7.61%	14.26%
		Ens.	4.65%	8.43%	13.94%
		Iter.Adv.	14.9%	13.90%	20.75%

Table 3: Attack success rate of adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN in semi-whitebox setting, and other white-box attacks under defenses on MNIST and CIFAR-10.

Defense	MNIST			CIFAR-10		
	FGSM	Opt.	AdvGAN	FGSM	Opt.	AdvGAN
Adv.	3.1%	3.5%	11.5%	13.58%	10.8%	15.96%
Ens.	2.5%	3.4%	10.3%	10.49%	9.6%	12.47%
Iter.Adv.	2.4%	2.5%	12.2%	22.96%	21.70%	24.28%

Table 4: Attack success rate of adversarial examples generated by different black-box adversarial strategies under defenses on MNIST and CIFAR-10

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- Title: Defense-GAN: Protecting Classifiers Against Adversarial Attacks Using Generative Models
- 'denoise' adversarial examples
- Defense-GAN is trained to model the distribution of unperturbed images.
- Defense-GAN can be used with **any classification** model and **does not modify the classifier** structure or training procedure.

Training Defense-GAN

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

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Obtain a G on training dataset first.



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Table 1: Classification accuracies of different classifier and substitute model combinations using various defense strategies on the MNIST dataset, under FGSM black-box attacks with $\epsilon = 0.3$. Defense-GAN has $L = 200$ and $R = 10$.

Classifier/ Substitute	No Attack	No Defense	Defense- GAN-Rec	Defense- GAN-Orig	MagNet	Adv. Tr. $\epsilon = 0.3$	Adv. Tr. $\epsilon = 0.15$
A/B	0.9970	0.6343	<u>0.9312</u>	0.9282	0.6937	0.9654	0.6223
A/E	0.9970	0.5432	0.9139	0.9221	0.6710	0.9668	<u>0.9327</u>
B/B	0.9618	0.2816	<u>0.9057</u>	0.9105	0.5687	0.2092	0.3441
B/E	0.9618	0.2128	<u>0.8841</u>	0.8892	0.4627	0.1120	0.3354
C/B	0.9959	0.6648	<u>0.9357</u>	0.9322	0.7571	0.9834	0.9208
C/E	0.9959	0.8050	0.9223	0.9182	0.6760	0.9843	<u>0.9755</u>
D/B	0.9920	0.4641	<u>0.9272</u>	0.9323	0.6817	0.7667	0.8514
D/E	0.9920	0.3931	0.9164	<u>0.9155</u>	0.6073	0.7676	0.7129

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Table 4: Classification accuracies of different classifier models using various defense strategies on the MNIST (top) and F-MNIST (bottom) datasets, under FGSM, RAND+FGSM, and CW white-box attacks. Defense-GAN has $L = 200$ and $R = 10$.

Attack	Classifier Model	No Attack	No Defense	Defense-GAN-Rec	MagNet	Adv. Tr. $\epsilon = 0.3$
FGSM $\epsilon = 0.3$	A	0.997	0.217	0.988	0.191	<u>0.651</u>
	B	0.962	0.022	0.956	<u>0.082</u>	0.060
	C	0.996	0.331	0.989	0.163	<u>0.786</u>
	D	0.992	0.038	0.980	0.094	<u>0.732</u>
RAND+FGSM $\epsilon = 0.3, \alpha = 0.05$	A	0.997	0.179	0.988	0.171	<u>0.774</u>
	B	0.962	0.017	0.944	0.091	<u>0.138</u>
	C	0.996	0.103	0.985	0.151	<u>0.907</u>
	D	0.992	0.050	0.980	0.115	<u>0.539</u>
CW ℓ_2 norm	A	0.997	<u>0.141</u>	0.989	0.038	0.077
	B	0.962	0.032	0.916	0.034	<u>0.280</u>
	C	0.996	<u>0.126</u>	0.989	0.025	0.031
	D	0.992	<u>0.032</u>	0.983	0.021	0.010

Attack	Classifier Model	No Attack	No Defense	Defense-GAN-Rec	MagNet	Adv. Tr. $\epsilon = 0.3$
FGSM $\epsilon = 0.3$	A	0.934	0.102	0.879	0.089	<u>0.797</u>
	B	0.747	0.102	0.629	0.168	0.136
	C	0.933	0.139	0.896	0.110	<u>0.804</u>
	D	0.892	0.082	0.875	0.099	<u>0.698</u>
RAND+FGSM $\epsilon = 0.3, \alpha = 0.05$	A	0.934	0.102	0.888	0.096	<u>0.447</u>
	B	0.747	0.131	0.661	<u>0.161</u>	0.119
	C	0.933	0.105	0.893	0.112	<u>0.699</u>
	D	0.892	0.091	0.862	0.104	<u>0.626</u>
CW ℓ_2 norm	A	0.934	0.076	0.896	0.060	<u>0.157</u>
	B	0.747	<u>0.172</u>	0.656	0.131	0.118
	C	0.933	0.063	0.896	0.084	<u>0.107</u>
	D	0.892	0.090	0.875	0.069	<u>0.149</u>