University of Idaho

Department of Computer Science

CS 487/587 Adversarial Machine Learning

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Lecture 1

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

Lecture Outline

- Introduction to Adversarial ML (AML)
  - Adversarial examples
- Attack taxonomy
- Adversarial evasion attacks
  - Random noise, FGSM, PGD, DeepFool, C&W attack
  - Transferability of adversarial examples
  - Adversarial attacks on Large Language Models
- Defense against adversarial evasion attacks
  - Adversarial training, example detection, gradient masking, robust optimization
- Poisoning attacks and defenses
- Privacy attacks and defenses
- Summary
- References and AML resources

Machine Learning

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- ML is ubiquitous today in many applications



Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) achieved high accuracy on image classification



Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- ML algorithms are vulnerable to small input perturbations
  - The model misclassified ***adversarially manipulated images***



Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- The differences between the original and adversarially manipulated images are very small (hardly noticeable to the human eye)



Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- An early work and a seminal paper on AML shows an adversarially perturbed image of a panda that is misclassified by the ML model as a gibbon
  - The image with the perturbation looks indistinguishable from the original image
- ***Adversarial examples*** **are inputs to ML models that an attacker intentionally designed to cause the model to make mistakes**

Original image

Classified as panda
57.7% confidence



Small adversarial noise

Adversarial image

Classified as gibbon
99.3% confidence

Gibbon

Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- Similar example, from [Szagedy (2014) Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks]



Adversarial ML

Adversarial Examples

- The classification accuracy of DNNs on adversarial images drops significantly, in comparison to regular non-perturbed images
  - Classification accuracy on regular (non-perturbed) images

Without Attack	MNIST Dataset	CIFAR-10 Dataset	ImageNet Dataset
	99.4 %	94.8 %	74.5 %

  - Classification accuracy on adversarial (perturbed) images

Attack	MNIST Dataset	CIFAR-10 Dataset	ImageNet Dataset
Fast Gradient Sign Method	54 %	15 %	1 %
Projected Gradient Descent	9 %	8 %	0 %
Deep Fool	0 %	2 %	11 %
C&W	0 %	0 %	0 %

Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- If a Stop sign is adversarially manipulated and it is not recognized by a self-driving car: the car can keep going, and it can result in an accident



Small adversarial noise

Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- The authors of this work manipulated a Stop sign with adversarial patches
  - Caused the DL model of a self-driving car to misclassify it as a Speed Limit 45 sign
    - The authors achieved 100% attack success in lab test, and 85% in field test



Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- This paper presents an example of a 3D-printed turtle that is misclassified by a DNN as a rifle (video link)
  - The texture of the turtle is designed to mislead the DNN



Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- A person wearing an adversarial patch is not detected by a DNN person detector model (YOLOv2)
  - E.g., can be used by intruders to get past security cameras



Figure 1: We create an adversarial patch that is successfully able to hide persons from a person detector. Left: The person without a patch is successfully detected. Right: The person holding the patch is ignored.

Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Examples

- Shown below are the predicted segmentation result by an ML model for an original image and an adversarial example
  - The attack removes the class pedestrians in the segmentation output
  - A self-driving car that uses the ML segmentation model can consider that the road is clear of pedestrians

(a) Image

(b) Prediction

(c) Adversarial Example

(d) Prediction



ML Failure Cases

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- Current ML models have limited capabilities to reason about the spatial or causal relations of the objects in images
- E.g., predictions by a DL model on images of randomly positioned parts
  - The model assigns weights to different features in images, and outputs a category based on the sum of weights for all features
  - It does not take into account the spatial relations between the features in making the prediction (the guitar parts need to be composed in a particular order to make a guitar)



ML Failure Cases

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- A "train" in the hallway?
  - ML models fail to use the context in images, e.g., cannot infer cause and effect between the objects – a train cannot fit in a hallway
  - On the positive note, the person holding the Stop sign is correctly predicted as Person by the DNN



Failure Cases of Our Vision System

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- Although our vision system has remarkable robustness to noise and distortion, there are still cases when it can fail
  - For instance, *optical illusions* can deceive our vision system
- There are no black dots in the image



Failure Cases of Our Vision System

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- Optical illusions can be considered adversarial examples of our vision system
- There are no curved lines in this image



Abusive Use of ML

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- Abusive use of machine learning is on the rise
  - E.g., using GANs to generate fake content (a.k.a. deep fakes)
    - Videos of politicians saying things they never said
      - Barak Obama's deep fake, or the ex-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi appears drunk in a video
    - Bill Hader's impersonation of Arnold Schwarzenegger
  - Can have strong ***societal implications***: elections, automated trolling, court evidence



Adversarial ML

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- The development of ML algorithms for real-world applications is primarily focused on performance metrics related to the accuracy
  - Design methods are needed that place emphasis on ML models that are secure and robust, but also fair, unbiased, and ethical
- ***Adversarial ML (AML)*** refers to ML in adversarial settings
  - ***Attack*** is a major component of AML
    - Bad actors do bad things
      - Their main objective is not to get detected (can change behavior to avoid detection)
    - Attackers design ***adversarial examples*** with an intention to cause an ML model to make mistakes and performs incorrectly
  - ***Defenses*** against adversarial attacks is the other major component of AML
    - ML security should be approached through proactive defense: ML designers discover vulnerabilities in ML systems, simulate potential attacks, and develop countermeasures
- ***AML*** **is the study of the attacks on machine learning algorithms, and of the defenses against such attacks**

Adversarial ML

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- Not only Neural Networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks
- All ML models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, including:
  - Linear models (e.g., logistic regression)
  - SVMs
  - Decision trees
  - Nearest neighbors
  - Reinforcement learning models
- In addition, attacks on ML models that work with other data formats besides images have been demonstrated, such as:
  - Audio data
  - Text data
  - Malware files
  - Spam messages
  - Industrial sensory data

Adversarial ML

Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning

- Studying adversarial examples in the ***image domain*** has been predominant in prior AML work
- Reasons:
  1. Perceptual similarity between clean and adversarial images is intuitive to observers
  2. Image data and image classifiers have simpler structure than other domains (e.g., audio, or malware)
- Commonly used datasets for concept evaluation in AML include:
  - MNIST: 60K images, digits 0 to 9
  - CIFAR-10: 60K images, 10 classes: cars, birds, airplanes, cats, dogs, deer, frogs, horses, ships, trucks
  - ImageNet: 14M images, 20K classes
    - ImageNet-1K subset: 1.28M images, 1K classes
- Recent works has focused on attacks on Large Language Models

Attack Taxonomy and Threat Model

Attack Taxonomy

- A ***taxonomy of adversarial attacks*** is typically derived based on an assumed ***threat model*** regarding the goal, knowledge, and target strategy of the adversary
- Adversary's goal
  - *Poisoning attack, evasion attack*: cause the ML model to perform incorrectly
  - *Privacy attack*: acquire knowledge about the training data or the model
  - *Availability attack*: cause the ML model to be become unavailable
- Adversary's knowledge
  - *White-box attack*: the adversary has full knowledge of the ML model
  - *Black-box attack*: has no knowledge of the ML model
  - *Gray-box attack*: has some knowledge of the ML model
- Adversary's target strategy
  - *Targeted attack*: cause the ML model to output a target label for an input
  - *Non-targeted attack*: cause the ML to output any incorrect label for an input

Poisoning Attack

Attack Taxonomy

- ***Poisoning attack***
  - Attack on the training phase
    - Attacker perturbs the training dataset or the trained model
      - Change the labels to training inputs
      - Insert malicious inputs in the training set, e.g., that contain a trigger pattern to poison the model
      - Change the weights of a deployed trained model
    - The goal is to corrupt the ML model so that it performs incorrectly for some or all inputs
    - The adversary needs to obtain access to the training dataset to insert or modify samples, or to the trained model
      - E.g., web-based repositories and "honeypots" often collect malware examples for training, which provides an opportunity for adversaries to poison the data



Evasion Attack

Attack Taxonomy

- ***Evasion attack***
  - Attack on the testing phase
    - Attacker does not tamper with the ML model, but instead cause it to misclassify adversarial inputs (adversarial examples)
    - In cybersecurity, the term "evasion" means *to bypass a detection system*
    - Evasion attack is more common than poisoning attack
      - E.g., the shown examples with sticking a few pieces of tapes on a Stop sign can cause misclassification by the ML model for road sign recognition used by an autonomous driving vehicle



White-box and Black-box Attack

Attack Taxonomy

- Based on adversary's knowledge, evasion attacks can be further classified into:
  - ***White-box attack***
    - Attackers have full knowledge about the ML model
    - I.e., they have access to parameters, hyperparameters, gradients, architecture, etc.
  - ***Black-box attack***
    - Attackers don't have access to the ML model parameters, gradients, architecture
    - Attackers may query the black-box model (also known as the *oracle*) to obtain knowledge about the model
      - E.g., submit adversarial examples, and obtain the model's output (class label)
    - Black-box attacks are more realistic, because model designers usually do not provide open access to the model
  - ***Gray-box attack***
    - Attackers have some knowledge about the ML model

Non-targeted and Targeted Attack

Attack Taxonomy

- Each of the described attacks can further be:
  - ***Non-targeted*** attack
    - The goal is to mislead the classifier for an adversarial input to output any label other than the ground-truth label
    - E.g., perturb an image of a lion, so that the model predicts it is any other class than a lion
  - ***Targeted*** attack
    - The goal is to mislead the classifier to predict a target label for an adversarial input
    - More difficult, in comparison to non-targeted attack
    - E.g., perturb an image of a turtle, so that the model predicts it is a riffle
    - E.g., perturb an image of a Stop sign, so that the model predicts it is a Speed Limit 45 sign

Privacy and Availability Attacks

Attack Taxonomy

- In some references, poisoning and evasion attacks are grouped together into ***integrity attacks***
  - It means that the integrity of the model to perform correctly for some of all inputs is attacked
  - Conversely, in privacy and availability attacks, adversary' goal is not related to causing incorrect performance of ML models
- ***Privacy attack***
  - The goal is to illegitimately gain knowledge about the training inputs or the models
  - A.k.a. inference attack, or confidentiality attack
  - E.g., identify whether a particular data sample was used to train an ML model
- ***Availability attacks***
  - Cause an ML system to become unavailable or block regular use of the system (denial-of-service)
    - E.g., design adversarial samples that take an extremely long time for the ML model to process
  - Availability attacks are the least common type of adversarial attacks

Trustworthy AI

- AML is part of a broader area in AI called ***trustworthy AI***, which combines efforts to address current limitations and ensure that end-users can trust the predictions by AI models
- Topics in trustworthy AI include:
  - Robustness
    - Small input perturbations can impact the model predictions
  - Generalization
    - OOD (out-of-distribution) inputs; e.g., a model trained on medical images in one hospital performs poorly on images in another hospital (due to different equipment of settings used)
  - Explainability
    - The decision-making process of large models is non-transparent and difficult to understand
  - Fairness
    - Predictions can show bias against demographic groups, based on gender, age, culture
  - Privacy protection
    - Models can memorize and reveal input data; e.g., a model can reveal sensitive private information in medical records used for training
  - Ethics
    - The models should produce ethical decisions that are aligned with our human values (also referred to as AI Alignment)

Evasion Attacks

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Evasion attacks: the goal is to create a manipulated image (adversarial example) that is *similar* to the original image, but it is classified by the ML model as another class



Common Evasion Attacks

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) attack
- Projected gradient descent (PGD) attack
- DeepFool attack
- Carlini & Wagner (C&W) attack
- Jacobian-based saliency map attack
- Universal attack
- One-pixel attack
- Elastic-net attack
- Spatially transformed attack

Random Noise Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Random noise attack***
  - The simplest form of adversarial attack is to add random noise to the input image
    - E.g., pixels containing random numbers from a normal distribution (0 mean and 1 st. dev.)
  - This attack represents a non-targeted black-box evasion attack
    - It is not efficient, since the noisy images are easily distinguishable from the original images
    - Therefore, it can barely be considered an actual adversarial attack

Prediction: gorilla

+



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

Prediction: fountain

FGSM Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) attack***
  - Goodfellow (2015) Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples
- An adversarial image x_{adv} is created by adding perturbation noise to an image x

$$x_{adv} = x + \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}\big(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y)\big)$$

  - Notation: input image x, class label y, NN model C, NN weights (parameters) w, loss function $\mathcal{L}$, gradient ∇ (Greek letter "nabla"), perturbation magnitude ϵ
  - The amount of perturbation is calculated based on the gradient of the loss function $\mathcal{L}$ with respect to the input image x for the true class label y (i.e., $\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y)$
  - The sign function sgn(x) is defined as:

$$\text{sgn}(x) := \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } x < 0, \\ 0 & \text{if } x = 0, \\ 1 & \text{if } x > 0. \end{cases}$$

FGSM Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Examples of image gradient $\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y)$ with respect to image x for a label y
  - The gradient quantifies the importance of image pixels toward classifying the image x to the class y

Image x

Gradient $\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y)$



FGSM Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- FGSM is a white-box non-targeted evasion attack
  - White-box, since we need to know the gradients $\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y)$ to create the adversarial image
  - In the shown example, the perturbation magnitude is $\epsilon = 0.007$
  - FGSM calculates the perturbation that needs to be added to each pixel in x, so that the loss $\mathcal{L}$ is maximized, leading to incorrect prediction by the model (i.e., $C(x, w) \neq y$)

x

"panda"
57.7% confidence

$+ .007 \times$



$\text{sign}(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y))$

perturbation

$=$

$x + \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y))$

"gibbon"
99.3 % confidence

FGSM Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- FGSM attack example

Original image

Prediction: car mirror

Adversarial image

Prediction: sunglasses

PGD Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Projected gradient descent (PGD) attack***
  - Madry (2017) Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks
- PGD is an extension of the FGSM attack: it creates an adversarial image by repeatedly adding perturbation from the FGSM attack to the image x in multiple iterations
  - If the number of iterations steps is n, and γ is the amount of perturbation that is added at each step, the perturbed image after the n iterations is

$$x_{adv}^{n} = x^{n-1} + \gamma \cdot \text{sign}\left(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x^{n-1}, w), y)\right)$$

  - Applying multiple steps of adding perturbation increases the chances of misclassifying the adversarial image x_{adv}^{n}
  - Compare PGD to FGSM that applies perturbation in only one iteration, given with

$$x_{adv} = x + \epsilon \cdot \text{sign}\left(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(C(x, w), y)\right)$$

PGD Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- PGD attack example

Original image

Prediction: baboon

Adversarial image

Prediction: Egyptian cat

Egyptian cat

PGD Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Gradient approaches (FGSM, PGD) can also be designed as ***targeted white-box attacks***
  - The added perturbation aims to minimize the loss function of the image for a specific target class label
    - In the shown example, the target class is maraca



DeepFool Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***DeepFool attack***
  - Moosavi-Dezfooli (2015) DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks
- DeepFool is a white-box attack
  - It generates adversarial images with the minimal amount of perturbation possible
  - There is no visible change to the human eye between the two images



Prediction: canon | Difference | Prediction: Projector

DeepFool Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Comparison of added adversarial perturbation for DeepFool and FGSM
  - Original image: whale
  - Both DeepFool and FGSM perturb the image to be classified as turtle (targeted attack)
  - DeepFool finds smaller perturbation

DeepFool

Prediction: Turtle



Difference

FGSM



Prediction: Turtle

Difference

DeepFool Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- For example, consider a linear classifier algorithm applied to objects from 2 classes: green and orange circles
  - The line that separates the 2 classes is the hyperplane (or, decision boundary)
    - Data points falling on either sides of the hyperplane are attributed to different classes (such as benign vs. malicious class)
  - Given an input x, DeepFool projects x onto the hyperplane and pushes it just a bit beyond the hyperplane, thus misclassifying it





DeepFool Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- For a multiclass problem with linear classifiers, there are multiple hyperplanes that separate an input x from other classes
  - E.g., an example with 4 classes (0, 1, 2, and 3) is shown in the image below
- DeepFool finds that closest hyperplane to the input x_0: in this case, this is the hyperplane $\mathcal{F}_3$ (it represents the most similar class to x_0 of the other 3 classes)
  - Then, it projects the input x_0 onto the hyperplane $\mathcal{F}_3$ and pushes it a little beyond it



DeepFool Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- For non-linear classifiers (such as neural networks, having non-linear class boundaries), the authors performed several iterations of adding perturbations to the image
  - At each iteration, the classifier function is linearized around the current image x_0, and a minimal perturbation is calculated
  - The algorithm stops when the class of the image x_0 (with ground-truth label 4) changes to another label than the true class (e.g., label 3)





Carlini & Wagner (C&W) Attack

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Carlini &Wagner (C&W) attack***
  - Carlini (2017) Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks
- The generation of perturbation for creating adversarial examples is formulated as an optimization problem
  - Given an image x, labeled as class q
  - Create an adversarial image $x + \epsilon$, such that the distance $D(x, x + \epsilon)$ is minimal
  - The assigned label is different than q, i.e., $C(x + \epsilon) = t \neq q$
  - For a targeted attack, the following optimization problem is formulated

$$\text{minimize } D(x, x + \epsilon) \longrightarrow \text{distance between } x \text{ and } x{+}\epsilon$$

$$\text{such that } C(x + \epsilon) = t \longrightarrow x{+}\epsilon \text{ is classified as target class } t$$

- The details of C&W attack will be explained in a subsequent lecture

Evasion Attacks against Black-box Models

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Black-box evasion attacks*** can be classified into two broad categories: query-based and transfer-based attacks
  - ***Query-based attacks***
    - The adversary queries the model and creates adversarial examples by using the provided information to queries
    - The queried model can provide:
      - Output class probabilities (i.e., confidence scores per class), used with score-based attacks
      - Output class, used with decision-based attacks
    - A body of work has focused on query-efficient black-box attacks, where the goal is to synthesize adversarial examples using a limited number of queries



Evasion Attacks against Black-box Models

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Transfer-based attacks*** (or ***transferability attacks***)
  - The adversary does not query the model
- It was observed that the same adversarial examples are often attack-efficient across ML models
  - E.g., adversarial examples for a VGG model are also misclassified by a ResNet model
  - The adversary trains its own substitute/surrogate local model, and transfers the adversarial examples to the target model
- An attacker can take the following steps to reverse-engineer the classifier:
  1. Train his/her own (white-box) substitute ML model
  2. Generate adversarial samples for the substitute ML model
  3. Apply the adversarial samples to the target ML model

Adversarial Attacks on LLMs

Adversarial Attacks on LLMs

- ***Universal Attack on Large Language Models (LLMs)***
  - Zou (2023) Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models
- An adversarial suffix is added to input prompts to LLMs to generate outputs to questions that LLMs would normally refuse to answer
  - When the adversarial suffix is added to the prompt, LLMs produce answers that are objectionable or offensive



Adversarial Attacks on LLMs

Adversarial Attacks on LLMs

- The universal attack was applied to several LLMs (OpenAI ChatGPT, Anthropic Claude, Google BARD)
  - The adversarial prompts are transferable across different models
  - An example of an adversarial prompt is provided on the right





List of Adversarial Attacks

Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- List of adversarial attacks

Attack	Publication	Similarity	Attacking Capability	Algorithm	Apply Domain
L-BFGS	(Szegedy et al., 2013)	l_2	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
FGSM	(Goodfellow et al., 2014b)	l_∞,l_2	White-Box	Single-Step	Image Classification
Deepfool	(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016)	l_2	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
JSMA	(Papernot et al., 2016a)	l_2	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
BIM	(Kurakin et al., 2016a)	l_∞	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
C & W	(Carlini & Wagner, 2017b)	l_2	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
Ground Truth	(Carlini et al., 2017)	l_0	White-Box	SMT solver	Image Classification
Spatial	(Xiao et al., 2018b)	Total Variation	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
Universal	(Metzen et al., 2017b)	l_∞, l_2	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
One-Pixel	(Su et al., 2019)	l_0	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
EAD	(Chen et al., 2018)	$l_1 + l_2$, l_2	White-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
Substitute	(Papernot et al., 2017)	l_p	Black-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
ZOO	(Chen et al., 2017)	l_p	Black-Box	Iterative	Image Classification
Biggio	(Biggio et al., 2012)	l_2	Poisoning	Iterative	Image Classification
Explanation	(Koh & Liang, 2017)	l_p	Poisoning	Iterative	Image Classification
Zugner's	(Zügner et al., 2018)	Degree Distribution, Coocurrence	Poisoning	Greedy	Node Classification
Dai's	(Dai et al., 2018)	Edges	Black-Box	RL	Node & Graph Classification
Meta	(Zügner & Günnemann, 2019)	Edges	Black-Box	RL	Node Classification
C & W	(Carlini & Wagner, 2018)	max dB	White-Box	Iterative	Speech Recognition
Word Embedding	(Miyato et al., 2016)	l_p	White-Box	One-Step	Text Classification
HotFlip	(Ebrahimi et al., 2017)	letters	White-Box	Greedy	Text Classification
Jia & Liang	(Jia & Liang, 2017)	letters	Black-Box	Greedy	Reading Comprehension
Face Recognition	(Sharif et al., 2016)	physical	White-Box	Iterative	Face Recognition
RL attack	(Huang et al., 2017)	l_p	White-Box	RL	

Table from: Xu et al. (2019) - Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Images, Graphs and Text: A Review

Defense Against Evasion Attacks

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Adversarial samples can cause any ML algorithm to fail
  - However, they can also be used to build more accurate and robust models
  - The goal of ***adversarial defense*** is to build ML models with high accuracy on both clean (regular, natural, standard) examples and adversarial examples
- Defense strategies against adversarial evasion attacks can be categorized into:
  - Adversarial training
  - Adversarial example detection
  - Gradient masking/obfuscation
  - Robust optimization (regularization, certified defenses)

Adversarial Training

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Adversarial training*** defense involves training or retraining the ML model using adversarial examples
- The training dataset is augmented with adversarial examples produced by known types of attacks
  - E.g., for each clean example add one adversarial example to the training set
  - By adding adversarial examples x_{adv} with true label y to the training set, the model will learn that x_{adv} belongs to the class y
- Adversarial training is one of the most common adversarial defense methods currently used in practice
- Possible strategies:
  - Train the model from scratch using both regular and adversarial examples
  - Train the model on regular examples, and afterward fine-tune the model with adversarial examples

Adversarial Training

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Limitation of adversarial training is reduced accuracy on clean samples, known as ***accuracy versus robustness trade-off***
  - The figure depicts the difference between the classification error of an adversarially trained model - Std Err (AT), and a model trained on clean examples only - Std Err (Std)
  - Note that adversarial training reduced the performance (between 3% and 7%), depending on the size of the perturbation ε
  - Increasing the size of the dataset (number of labeled samples) reduces the gap



Figure from: Madry (2018) Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks

Adversarial Example Detection

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Adversarial examples detection*** methods are designed to distinguish adversarial examples from regular clean examples
  - If the defense method detects that an input example is adversarial, the classifier will refuse to predict its class label
- E.g., an auxiliary detection model is trained on regular and adversarial examples to perform a binary classification
  - If an input example is classified as benign, then it is safe to be fed to the main classifier to predict its class
- Limitation of this defense strategy is that it can be less effective in identifying examples created with unknown adversarial attacks

Gradient Masking/Obfuscation

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Gradient masking/obfuscation*** defense methods deliberately hide the gradient information of the model (from being used by an adversary)
  - Because most AML attacks are based on the model's gradient information, creating adversarial examples with such attacks becomes less successful
- Defense approaches
  - Shattered gradients methods – apply smoothing or denoising to input images, or discretize the pixel values to prevent the calculation of gradients
  - Distillation defense – change the scaling of the last hidden layer in NNs, preventing the calculation of gradients
  - DefenseGAN – uses a GAN model to project adversarially perturbed images into clean images, before classifying them
- Limitation of gradient masking/obfuscation defenses is that they are designed to confound the adversaries, but they cannot eliminate the existence of adversarial examples

Robust Optimization

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- ***Robust optimization*** methods aim to evaluate and improve the robustness of the ML model to adversarial attacks
  - These approaches change the way model parameters are learned, in order to minimize the misclassification of adversarial examples
- Defense approaches
  - Regularization methods – penalize large values of the model parameters, or large values of the gradients during the training
    - Therefore, changes in input data will not cause large change of the model output
  - Certified defenses – for a given dataset and model, verify the robustness of a trained model with respect to a metric (e.g., lower bound of the minimal perturbation)
    - A "certificate" guarantees that the model is safe against any perturbations smaller than the lower bound
  - Adversarial training also belongs to the category of robust optimization methods

Defense Against Evasion Attacks

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks



Figure from: Xu et al. (2019) - Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Images, Graphs and Text: A Review

Reasons for Existence of Adversarial Examples

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- What are the main reasons for the existence of adversarial examples in ML?
  - There is no universally agreed answer to this question
- Several hypothesis include:
  - DNNs are models with highly complexity and millions of parameters
    - Such models require large amounts of input data for robust prediction
    - The limited number of inputs used for training these models reduces their robustness
    - Adversarial examples represent low-probability pockets in the input space, which are difficult to find by randomly sampling the input space around a given example (Szagedy, 2014 - Intriguing Properties of Neural networks)
    - As a result, adversarial examples are never observed in the training phase, and the model is prone to incorrectly classify such examples
  - Adversarial examples are almost always close to the decision boundary
    - The decision boundary of DNNs is too curved or too inflexible (Moosavi-Dezfooli, 2017 - Analysis of Universal Adversarial Perturbations), which makes these models vulnerable to adversarial attacks
    - Studying the decision boundary of ML models can help to gain insights about the existence of adversarial examples

Real-World Adversarial Examples

Defense Against Adversarial Evasion Attacks

- Malware files
  - To bypass anti-malware detection ML models
  - E.g., ransomware, worms spread over a networks
- Spam messages
  - To avoid spam filters using ML classification models
- Images to deceive ML classifiers hosted as web-based API
- Attacks on ML-based network intrusion detection systems
- Crypto software
  - Evade ML systems, and use local computer resources for mining crypto currency
- URLs – to evade phishing URL classifiers

Poisoning Attacks in AML

Poisoning Attacks and Defenses

- In ***poisoning attacks***, the attacker tampers with the training process
  - This is conversely to evasion attacks, where the attacker does not assume the capability to interfere with the training process
- Poisoning attacks can be divided into the following:
  - Outsourcing attack
  - Pretrained attack
  - Data collection attack
  - Collaborative learning attack
  - Post-deployment attack
  - Code poisoning attack

Poisoning Attacks in AML

Poisoning Attacks and Defenses

- ***Outsourcing attack***
  - The user outsources the model training to a third-party
  - A malicious third-party provider inserts a backdoor into the ML model during the training process
- ***Pretrained attack***
  - The attacker releases a pretrained ML model that is backdoored
  - The victim uses the pretrained model, and re-trains it on their dataset
    - E.g., transfer learning with a backdoored ResNet model that is pretrained for image classification
- ***Data collection attack***
  - The victim collects data using public sources, and is unaware that some of the collected data have been poisoned
    - E.g., the victim relies on volunteers' contribution for data collection
    - Or, the victim downloads data from the Internet

Poisoning Attacks in AML

Poisoning Attacks and Defenses

- ***Collaborative learning attack***
  - Collaborative learning refers to a scenario when multiple users train a global model, where each user trains partially the model using their own local data
    - An example is federated learning
  - A malicious agent in collaborative learning sends updates that poison the model
- ***Post-deployment attack***
  - The attacker gets access to a model that has been deployed, and changes the model to insert a backdoor
    - E.g., the attacker can attack a cloud server or the physical machine where the model is located
- ***Code poisoning attack***
  - An attacker publicly posts an ML code that is designed to backdoor trained models
    - The victim downloads the code and applies it to solve a task

Poisoning Attack Example

Poisoning Attacks and Defenses

- A common poisoning attack includes inserting a backdoor trigger that causes the model to misclassify such inputs to a target class selected by the attacker
- In this example, the eyeglasses are used as the trigger
  - On clean inputs, a backdoored model performs correctly, and classifies all inputs with the correct class label
  - On trigger inputs that include the person wearing the eyeglasses, the backdoored model classifies the images to a target class (e.g., Admin)



Figure from: Gao et al. (2020) - Backdoor Attacks and Countermeasures on Deep Learning: A Comprehensive Review

Trojaning Attack

Poisoning Attacks and Defenses

- ***Trojaning Attack***
  - Liu (2018) Trojaning Attack on Neural Networks
  - A trojan trigger is a designed as a stamp that is added to some images
    - The adversarial images are afterward inserted into the training set
    - The model misclassifies the samples having the trojan trigger
  - Three examples of trojan triggers are shown in the upper picture: square, Apple logo, and watermark
  - Sample poisoned images with different levels of transparency of the trojan trigger (from 0% to 70% transparency) are shown in the lower picture
  - The model accuracy on the poisoned images is 3%, while on clean images is about 76%



Defenses Against Poisoning Attacks

Poisoning Attacks and Defenses

- ***Defense strategies*** against poisoning attacks are classified into the following two groups
- ***Inspection methods***
  - These methods can involve data inspection or model inspection
  - Data inspection defense – apply anomaly detection approaches to identify outlier input examples, based on a spectral signature, gradients, or activation values
  - Model inspection defense – include explainability approaches (e.g., based on heat maps), or inspecting the predictions for all labels (identify an outlier class)
- ***Backdoor removal methods***
  - Includes techniques to remove the backdoor, after it is identified by the inspection defense methods
    - E.g., remove trigger inputs, and retrain the model using only clean inputs
    - Or, change the labels of the poisoned inputs with triggers to the correct labels, and then retrain the model

Privacy Attacks in AML

Privacy Attacks and Defenses

- ***Privacy attacks*** are also referred to as *inference attacks* or *confidentiality attacks*
- Privacy attack examples
  - Reveal the identity of patients whose data was used for training a model
  - Reveal the architecture and parameters of a model that is used by an insurance company for predicting insurance rates
  - Reveal the model used by a financial institution for credit card approval
- Privacy attacks categories
  - Membership inference attack – determine whether an individual data instance was part of the training dataset for a model
  - Feature inference attack – extract information about the training dataset (e.g., recover sensitive features of the data)
  - Model extraction attack – create a substitute model that produces similar outputs as a target model (i.e., steal the model)

Model Inversion Attack

Privacy Attacks and Defenses

- Fredrickson (2015) Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures
- ***Model inversion attack*** creates prototype examples for the classes in the dataset
  - The authors demonstrated an attack against a DNN model for face recognition
  - Given a person's name and white-box access to the model, the attack reverse-engineered the model and produced an averaged image of that person
    - The obtained averaged image (left image below) makes the person recognizable
  - This attack is limited to classification models where the classes pertain to one type of object (such as faces of the same person)

Recovered image using the model inversion attack

Image of the person used for training the model

Training Data Extraction Attack

Privacy Attacks and Defenses

- Carlini (2020) Extracting training data from large language models
- Attack on *GPT-2* language model (LM)
  - GPT-2 has 1.5 billion parameters, it is trained on public data collected from the Internet
- The goal of the attack is to analyze output text sequences from GPT-2 and identify text that has been memorized by the model
  - The authors had black-box query access to the GPT-2 model
- Successfully extracted data included:
  - Personally identifiable information (PII): names, phone numbers, e-mail addresses
  - News headlines, log files, Internet forum conversations, code
- The extracted information in the shown example was present in just one document in the training data



Defenses against Privacy Attacks

Privacy Attacks and Defenses

- ***Defense strategies*** against privacy attacks in ML include:
  - Anonymization techniques
    - Remove identifying information in the data (e.g., remove names and addresses of people in a dataset)
  - Encryption techniques
    - Encrypt the training data, and train the model on encrypted data
  - Differential privacy
    - Add a small amount of random noise to the model parameters, or to the model gradients, or to the training data
  - Distributed learning
    - Allow multiple users to train locally a global model, without sharing their private data
    - The most popular approach is federated learning
  - Regularization techniques
    - Applying common ML regularization methods, such as dropout, weight decay, batch normalization can reduce information leakage by the models

Summary

Summary

- ML algorithms and methods are vulnerable to many types of attacks
  - This raises concerns, especially when ML models are applied to safety-critical applications
- Consequently, there has been a significant interest in studying AML attack and defense mechanisms
- Adversarial examples can be leveraged to improve the robustness of ML models
  - With current defense methods, improved robustness to adversarial examples often comes at a cost of reduced accuracy to clean unperturbed inputs
- It is important to further study and understand the vulnerabilities of ML models and develop efficient defense strategies

References

References

1. Introduction to Adversarial Machine Learning – blog post by Arunava Chakraborty
2. Binghui Wang: Adversarial Machine Learning — An Introduction
3. Daniel Lowd, Adversarial Machine Learning
4. Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Bo Li, Adversarial Machine Learning (Tutorial)
5. Xu (2019) Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Images, Graphs and Text: A Review (link)

Other AML Recourses

AML Recourses

- Adversarial Robustness Toolbox - a toolbox from IBM that implements state-of-the-art attacks and defenses
  - The algorithms are framework-independent, and support TensorFlow, Keras, PyTorch, MXNet, XGBoost, LightGBM, CatBoost, etc.
- Cleverhans - a repository from Google that implements latest research in AML
  - The library is being updated to support TensorFlow2, PyTorch, and Jax
- ScratchAI – a smaller AML library developed in PyTorch, and explained in this blog post
- Robust ML Defenses - list of adversarial defenses with code
- AML Tutorial – by Bo Li, Dawn Song, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
- Nicholas Carlini website