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STATISTICS AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN ECOLOGY
(with commentary)

Brian Dennis

Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources
and

Division of Statistics

University of Idaho

Moscow, ID 83844-1136 USA

phone: 208-885-7423

fax: 208-885-9080

email: brian@uidaho.edu

Abstract. Ecology as a science is under constant political pressure. The science is difficult and progress is slow, due to the variability of natural systems and the high cost of obtaining good data. Ecology however is charged with providing information support for environmental policy decisions with far reaching societal consequences. Demand for quick answers is strong, and demand for answers that agree with a particular point of view is even stronger.

The use of Bayesian statistical analyses has recently been advocated in ecology, supposedly to aid decision makers and enhance the pace of progress. Bayesian statistics provides conclusions in the face of incomplete information. Bayesian statistics, though, represents a much different approach to science than the frequentist statistics studied by most ecologists. The scientific implications of Bayesian statistics are not well understood.

I provide a critical review of the Bayesian approach. I compare, using a simple sampling example, the Bayesian and frequentist analyses. The Bayesian analyses can be “cooked” to produce results consistent with any point of view, because Bayesian analyses quantify prior personal beliefs and mix them with the data. In this, Bayesian statistics is consistent with the postmodern view of science, widely held among nonscientists, in which science is just a system of beliefs that has no particular authority over any other system of beliefs. By contrast, modern empirical science uses the scientific method to identify empirical contradictions in skeptics' beliefs and permit replication and checking of empirical results. Frequentist statistics has become an indispensable part of the scientific method.

I also undertake a critical discussion of statistics education in ecology. Part of the potential appeal of Bayesian statistics is that many ecologists are confused about frequentist statistics, and statistical concepts in general. I identify the source of confusion as arising from ecologists' attempts to learn statistics through a series of precalculus “statistical methods” courses taken in graduate school. I prescribe a radical change in the statistical training of ecological scientists which will greatly increase the level of confidence and facility with statistical thinking.

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INTRODUCTION

Science in the crosshairs

Tobacco company scientists argue that there is no evidence that smoking tobacco is harmful. Biblical creation scientists argue that the evidence for evolution is weak. Institutes paid for by industry are staffed by degreed scientists, whose job it is to create in the minds of politicians and the public the illusion of major scientific disagreements on environmental issues.

We are awash in a sea of popular postmodernism. Fact in the postmodern view is just strongly-held belief (Anderson 1990). Native Americans, according to tribal creation stories, did not originally cross over from Asia, but arose independently and originally in the Americas. The U.S. government is concealing dark secrets about the existence of extraterrestrial life, secrets which became partly exposed after a crash near the town of Roswell, New Mexico. Crystals have health and healing properties. One's personality and tendencies are influenced by the positions of solar system objects at the moment of birth. O. J. Simpson did not kill Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman.

The postmodern outlook is not confined to popular culture, but permeates intellectual life as well. Humanities disciplines at universities have abandoned the traditional empirical view of science (Sokal and Bricmont 1998). Feminists claim that the methods and requirements of science are biased against females. According to feminist scholars, if females formed the reigning power structure, science would be more cooperative in occupation and more tolerant of multiple explanations. "Science studies" historians focus on questionable behavior of well-known scientists toward colleagues, in order to expose science as a subjective power struggle. Multicultural philosophers portray science as just another of many legitimate ways of knowing, its successes due primarily to the dominance of European culture. Scientists' writings are deconstructed by literary theorists in order to reveal how the scientists were trapped by the prevailing cultural mental prisons. Political polemics from the intellectual left and right reveal disbelief and disrespect for established scientific knowledge.

Ecology

The questioning of science and the scientific method continues within the science of ecology.

Ecology has become a highly politicized science. Once a quiet backwater of biology, ecology burst into high public profile in the early 1970s (Earth Day, April 1970, was a watershed event) with the emergence of popular concern about environmental issues. After passage of the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the National Forest Policy and Management Act, and many other federal and state laws, ecologists and the findings of ecology suddenly had great influence in the lives of people everywhere. The scientific information from ecology, coupled with the environmental laws, forced constraints on peoples' behavior and economic activity.

Many ecological topics, from evolution to conservation biology to global climate change, hit people close to home. As a result, scientific signals are often masked or distorted by political noise. An ecological discovery that has impact on human conduct will often have a debunking campaign mounted against it by monied interests. Government agency scientists are

sometimes muzzled and have their findings reversed by the pen-stroke of a political appointee. Natural resource departments at state universities are pressured by special interest groups. Radio talk show hosts set themselves up as authoritative spokespersons on environmental topics.

Among practicing, credentialed ecologists, the science itself is quite contentious. The topic intrinsically attracts many participants, and the competition for admission to programs, jobs, journal space, grants, and recognition is fierce. Severe scientific and political infighting surfaces during position searches at university departments. Anonymous peer reviews can be ignorant and vindictive. Resources for curiosity-driven research are scarce; ecological research is funded more and more by agencies and companies with particular agendas. Pressures mount from environmental decision-makers for definitive answers. In this postmodern cacaphony, how can a healthy ecological science thrive?

In fact, some ecologists in the past couple of decades have questioned whether the Popperian hypothetico-deductive approach, and the collection of inquiry devices known as the scientific method, are too constraining for ecology. Good empirical data in ecology have often been too slow in coming or too difficult and expensive to collect, and scientific progress in ecology has seemed painfully slow. The calls for relaxed scientific guidelines have come from two main sources. First, some “theoretical ecologists” have sought scientific respect for their pencil, paper, and computer speculations on ecological dynamics. Their mathematical models however, frequently play the role of “concepts” rather than “hypotheses”, due to the lack of connections to data and the lack of widely accepted ecological laws with which to build models. As a result, theoretical ecologists have called for judging mathematical models under different criteria than scientific hypotheses would be judged. Articles in the November 1983 issue of *The American Naturalist* debated this question, among others, within the context of community ecology.

Second, applied ecologists and social decision-makers have often viewed the beetles-and-butterflies focus of ecological natural history research to be an unaffordable luxury. Academic ecology research is an exotic world of Galapagos birds, Carribean lizards, jungle orchids, and desert scorpions; it is slow, intellectual, and to some onlookers, produces few useful generalities. Yet, ecology also deals with vital topics within which major social decisions must be made, regardless of the amount of evidence available. Answers, in the form of “best judgements” by experts are needed, fast. For example, will breaching the Columbia watershed dams save salmon, or not?

A partial reading list for a seminar course on the “scientific method in ecology” might include Connor and Simberloff (1979, 1986), Saarinen (1980), *The American Naturalist* (1983 November), Hurlbert (1984), Strong et al. (1984), Hairston (1989), Underwood (1990), Peters (1991), Schrader-Frechette and McCoy (1993), and Dixon and Garrett (1993).

Inevitably bound up in this question about ecological science are concerns about statistical practice. The lack of true replication in many ecological experiments exposed by Hurlbert (1984) was a shocker. The lack of attention to power in many ecological studies has also been criticized (Toft and Shea 1983, Peterman 1990). Distribution-free statistical methods have been advocated (Potvin and Roff 1993), but some advocacy arguments have been challenged (Smith 1995, Johnson 1995). Stewart-Oaten (1995) criticized the tendency for

ecologists to view statistics as a set of procedural rules for data analysis. The widespread misinterpretation of statistical hypothesis testing has inspired much discussion (Simberloff 1990, Underwood 1990, Yoccoz 1991, Johnson 1999). The lack of statistical connections between “nonlinear dynamics” models and ecological data was criticized (Dennis et al. 1995). Specific ecological topics, such as the prevalence of density dependent population regulation, have spawned their own statistical literature (see Dennis and Taper 1994).

Bayesian statistics

According to some (Reckhow 1990, Ellison 1996, Johnson 1999), there is a statistical solution to many of ecology's ills. The touted solution is Bayesian statistics. Bayesian statistics is remarkably different from the variety of statistics called frequentist statistics that most of us learned in college. Bayesian statistics abandons many concepts that most of us struggled (with mixed success) to learn: hypothesis testing, confidence intervals, *P*-values, standard errors, power. Bayesians claim to offer improved methods for assessing the weight of evidence for hypotheses, making predictions, and making decisions in the face of inadequate data. In a cash-strapped science charged with information support in a highly contentious political arena, the Bayesian promises are enticing to ecological researchers and managers alike.

But is there a price to pay? You bet. Bayesians embrace the postmodern view of science. The Bayesian approach abandons notions of science as a quest for “objective” truth and scientists as detached, skeptical observers. Like postmoderns, Bayesians claim that those notions are misleading at best. In the world of Bayesian statistics, truth is personal and is measured by blending data with personal beliefs. Bayesian statistics is a way of explicitly organizing and formulating the blending process.

There is an enormous literature on Bayesian statistics. A glance at the titles in any current statistics journal (say, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, or *Biometrika*) might convince a casual onlooker that the world of statistics is becoming Bayesian. The Bayesian viewpoint is indeed gaining influence. The burgeoning literature, however, tends to be highly mathematical, and a scientist is right to question whether the attraction is mathematical instead of scientific. Actually, frequentism is alive and well in statistics. Introductory textbooks and courses remain overwhelmingly frequentist, as do canned computer statistics packages available to researchers. Frequentist and Bayesian statisticians waged war for many years, but the conflict quieted down around 1980 or so, and the two camps coexist now in statistics without much interaction.

Ecology, however, represents fertile, uncolonized ground for Bayesian ideas. The Bayesian-frequentist arguments, which many statisticians tired of twenty years ago, have not been considered much by ecologists. A handful of Bayesian papers have appeared in the ecological literature (see the featured group of articles in the November 1996 *Ecological Applications*, vol. 6(4)). Their enthusiastic exposition of Bayesian methods, and portrayal of frequentism as an anachronistic yoke impeding ecological progress, has attracted the attention of natural resource managers (Marmorek 1996).

The Bayesian propagule has arrived at the shore. Ecologists need to think long and hard about the consequences of a Bayesian ecology. The Bayesian outlook is a successful competitor, but is it a weed?

I think so. In this paper, I attempt to draw a clear distinction for ecologists between Bayesian and frequentist science. I address a simple environmental sampling problem and discuss the differences between the frequentist and the Bayesian statistical analyses. While I concur with Bayesians regarding critiques of some of the imperfections of frequentism, I am alarmed at the potential for disinformation and abuse that Bayesian statistics would give to environmental pressure groups and biased investigators. At the risk of repeating a lot of basic statistics, I develop the sampling example rather extensively from elementary principles. The aim is to amplify the subtle and not-so-subtle conflicts between the Bayesian and frequentist interpretations of the sampling results.

Readers interested in a more rigorous analysis of the scientific issues in the frequentist/Bayesian debate are urged to consult Mayo's (1996) comprehensive account.

One thing has become painfully clear to me in twenty years of extensive teaching, statistical consulting, reviewing, and interacting in ecology. Ecologists' understanding of statistics in general is abysmally poor. Statistics, which should naturally be a source of strength and confidence to an ecologist, no matter how empirically oriented he/she is, is all too frequently a source of weakness, insecurity, and embarrassment. The crucial concepts of frequentism, let alone Bayesianism, are widely misunderstood. I place the blame squarely on ecologists' statistical educations, which I find all wrong. In a later section of this paper, I offer some solutions to this problem. Ecologists, whether Bayesian or frequentist, will be better served by statistics with a radical revision of university statistics coursework.

WHAT IS FREQUENTISM?

“Nature cannot be fooled.” —Richard Feynman

Suppose a reach of a stream is to be sampled for Cu pollution. A total of 10 samples will be collected from the reach in some random fashion, and Cu concentration ($\mu\text{g l}^{-1}$) will be determined in each sample.

The purpose of the samples is to estimate the average concentration of Cu in the water at the time of sampling. The sampling could be a part of an ongoing monitoring study, an upstream/downstream/before/after study, or similar such study.

Frequentist statistics involves building a probability model for the observations. The modeling aspect of statistics is crucial to its understanding and proper use; however, the pre-calculus statistics methods courses taken by ecologists-in-training tend to emphasize formulas instead of models. I therefore develop the modeling aspect in more detail than is customary in frequentist analyses, so that the approach may be contrasted properly with the Bayesian way.

We might suppose that the observations of Cu concentration could be modeled as if they arose independently from a normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ^2 . Applied statistics texts would word this model as follows: each sample is assumed to be drawn at random from a “population” of such samples, with the population of Cu values having a frequency distribution well-approximated by a normal curve. The population mean is μ , and the population variance is σ^2 . Mathematical (i.e. post-calculus) statistics texts would state: the observations $\{X_i\}, i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ are assumed to be independent, identically distributed normal(μ, σ^2) random variables. Regardless of the wording and symbology, the important

point is that a probability model is assumed for *how the variability in the data arose*. The analyses are based on the model, and so it will be important to evaluate the model assumptions somehow. If the model is found wanting, then proper analyses will require construction of some other model.

We suppose the observations are drawn; their numerical values are x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n ($n = 10$). Symbols are used for the actual values drawn so that the subsequent formulas will be general to other data sets; the lower case notation indicates fixed constants (sample already drawn) instead of upper-case random variables (sample yet to be drawn). The distinction is absolutely crucial in frequentist statistics and is excruciating for teachers and students alike. (Educators in ecology should be aware that pre-calculus basic statistics textbooks, in response to the overwhelming symbol allergies of today's undergraduates, have universally abandoned the big- X little- x notation, and with it all hope that statistics concepts are intended to be understood). Let us suppose that the investigator has dutifully calculated some summary statistics from the samples, in particular the sample mean $\bar{x} = (\sum_{i=1}^n x_i)/n$ and the sample

variance $s^2 =$

$[\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2]/(n - 1)$, and that the resulting numerical values are:

$$\bar{x} = 50.6,$$

$$s^2 = 25.0.$$

The probability model for the observations is represented mathematically by the normal distribution, with probability density function (pdf) given by

$$f(x) = (\sigma^2 2\pi)^{-1} \exp[-(x - \mu)^2/(2\sigma^2)], \quad -\infty < x < \infty.$$

This is the bell-shaped curve. The cumulative distribution function (cdf) is the area under the curve between $-\infty$ and x and is customarily denoted $F(x)$. The probabilistic meaning of the model is contained in the cdf; it is the probability that a random observation X will take a value less than or equal to some particular constant value x :

$$F(x) = \text{P}[X \leq x] = \int_{-\infty}^x f(u) du.$$

Again, the lower and upper case X's have different meanings. The constants μ and σ^2 are "parameters." In applied stat texts, μ and σ^2 are interpreted respectively as the mean and variance of the "population" being sampled. Bear in mind that the population here is the collection of all possible samples that could have been selected on that sampling occasion. It is this potential variability of the samples that is being modeled in frequentist statistics.

An essential concept to master for understanding frequentist and Bayesian statistics alike is the likelihood function. The pdf $f(x)$ quantifies the relative frequency with which a single observation takes a value within a tiny interval of x . The whole sample, however, consists of n observations. Under the independence assumption, the product $f(x_1)f(x_2)\dots f(x_n)$

quantifies the relative frequency with which the whole sample, if repeated, would take values within a tiny interval of x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , the sample actually observed. The product is the “probability of observing what you observed” relative to all other possible samples in the population. Mathematically, the random process consists of n independent random variables X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n . The product $f(x_1)f(x_2)\dots f(x_n)$ is the joint pdf of the process, evaluated at the data values.

The joint pdf of the process, evaluated at the data, is the *likelihood function*. For this normal model, the likelihood function is a function of the parameters μ and σ^2 . The relative likelihood of the sample x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n depends on the the values of the parameters; if μ were 100 and σ^2 were 1, then the relative chance of observing sample values clustered around 50 would be very small indeed. Written out, the likelihood function for this normal model is

$$\begin{aligned} L(\mu, \sigma^2) &= f(x_1)f(x_2)\dots f(x_n) \\ &= (\sigma^2 2\pi)^{-n/2} \exp \left[- (2\sigma^2)^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \mu)^2 \right]. \end{aligned}$$

An algebraic trick well-known to statisticians is to add $-\bar{x} + \bar{x}$ inside each term $(x_i - \mu)$ in the sum. Squaring the terms and summing expresses the likelihood function in terms of two sample statistics, \bar{x} and s^2 :

$$L(\mu, \sigma^2) = (\sigma^2 2\pi)^{-n/2} \exp \left\{ - (2\sigma^2)^{-1} \left[(n-1)s^2 + n(\mu - \bar{x})^2 \right] \right\}. \quad (1)$$

Only the numbers \bar{x} and s^2 are needed to calculate the likelihood for any particular values of μ and σ^2 ; once \bar{x} and s^2 are in hand, the original data values are not required further for estimating the model parameters. The statistics \bar{x} and s^2 are said to be *jointly sufficient* for μ and σ^2 .

Because likelihood functions are typically products, algebraic and computational operations are often simplified by working with the log-likelihood function, $\ln L$:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln L(\mu, \sigma^2) &= -(n/2) \ln(2\pi) - (n/2) \ln \sigma^2 \\ &\quad - (n-1)s^2/(2\sigma^2) - n(\mu - \bar{x})^2/(2\sigma^2). \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Modern frequentist statistics can be said to have been inaugurated in 1922 by R. A. Fisher, who first realized the importance of the likelihood function (Fisher 1922). Fisher noted that the likelihood function offers a way of using data to *estimate* the parameters in a model if the parameter values are unknown. Subsequently, J. Neyman and E. S. Pearson used the likelihood function to construct a general method of statistical hypothesis testing, that is, the use of data to select between two rival statistical models (Neyman and Pearson 1933). More recently, the work of H. Akaike (1973, 1974) launched a class of likelihood-based methods for model selection when there are more than two candidate models from which to choose.

Two cases for inferences about μ will be considered: σ^2 known, and σ^2 unknown. The “ σ^2 known” case is obviously of limited practical usefulness in ecological work. However, it allows a simple and clear contrast between the Bayesian and frequentist approaches. The “ σ^2 unknown” case highlights the differences in how so-called “nuisance parameters” are handled in the Bayesian and frequentist contexts, and also hints at the numerical computing difficulties attendant with the use of more realistic models. I concentrate on point estimates, hypothesis tests, and confidence intervals.

σ^2 known

We assume that σ^2 is a known constant, say, $\sigma^2 = 36$.

Fisher (1922) developed the concept of *maximum likelihood* (ML) estimation. The value of μ , call it $\hat{\mu}$, that maximizes the likelihood function (Eq. 1) is the ML estimate. The ML estimate also maximizes the log-likelihood function (Eq. 2). It is a simple calculus exercise to show that Eq. 2 is maximized by

$$\hat{\mu} = \bar{x}.$$

Thus, a point estimate for μ calculated from the sample is $\hat{\mu} = 50.6$.

ML point estimates were shown by Fisher (1922) and numerous subsequent investigators to have many desirable statistical properties, among them: (a) Asymptotic unbiasedness (statistical distribution of estimate approaches a distribution with the correct mean as n becomes large). (b) Consistency (distribution of the parameter estimate concentrates around the true parameter value as n becomes large). (c) Asymptotic normality (distribution of the parameter estimate approaches a normal distribution, a celebrated central limit theorem-like result). (d) Asymptotic efficiency (the asymptotic variance of the parameter estimate is as small as is theoretically possible). These and other properties are thoroughly covered by Stuart and Ord (1991). Deriving these properties forms the core of a modern Ph. D.-level mathematical statistics course (Lehmann 1983).

These statistical properties refer to behavior of the estimate under hypothetical repeated sampling. To illustrate, the whole population of possible samples induces a whole population of possible ML estimates. In our case, to each random sample X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n there corresponds a sample mean \bar{X} , a random variable. The frequency distribution of the possible estimate values is the *sampling distribution* of the ML estimate. The sampling distribution plays no role in Bayesian inference, but is a cornerstone of frequentist analyses.

When reading statistics papers, one should note that the “hat” notation for estimates (e.g. $\hat{\mu}$) is frequently used interchangeably to denote both the random variable (\bar{X}) as well as the realized value (\bar{x}). This does not create confusion for statisticians, because the meaning is usually clear from context. However, the distinction can trip up the unwary. A quick test of one’s grasp of statistics is to define and contrast μ, \bar{x}, \bar{X} , and $\hat{\mu}$ (ornery professors looking for curveballs to throw at Ph. D. candidates during oral exams, please take note).

In our example, the sampling distribution of the ML estimate is particularly simple. The exact sampling distribution of \bar{X} is a normal distribution with a mean of μ and a variance of σ^2/n . The independent normal model for the observations is especially convenient because the

sampling distribution of various statistics can be derived mathematically. In other models, such as the multinomial models used in categorical data analysis or the dependent normal models used in time series analysis, the sampling distributions cannot be derived exactly and instead are approximated with asymptotic results (central limit theorem, etc.) or studied with computer simulation.

A *statistical hypothesis test* is a data-driven choice between two statistical models. Consider a fixed reference Cu concentration, μ_0 , that has to be maintained or attained, for instance, $\mu_0 = 48$. One position is that the reference concentration prevails in the stream, the other position is that it does not. The positions can be summarized as two statistical hypotheses: H_0 : the observations arise from a normal(μ_0, σ^2) distribution, and H_1 : the observations arise from a normal(μ, σ^2) distribution, where μ is not restricted to the value μ_0 . In beginning statistics texts, these hypotheses are often stated as $H_0: \mu = \mu_0$, $H_1: \mu \neq \mu_0$. A decision involves two possible errors, provided the normal distribution portion of the hypotheses is viable. First, H_0 could be true but H_1 is selected (Type I error); second, H_1 could be true but H_0 is selected (Type II error). Both errors have associated *conditional* probabilities: α , the probability of erroneously choosing H_1 , given H_0 is true, and β , the probability of erroneously choosing H_0 , given H_1 is true. Both of these error probabilities are set by the investigator. One probability, typically α , is set arbitrarily at some low value, for instance 0.05 or 0.01. The corresponding hypothesis assumed true, H_0 , is termed the *null* hypothesis. The other probability is controlled by the design of the sample or experiment (sample size, etc.) and the choice of test statistic. The hypothesis assumed true in this case, H_1 , is the *alternative* hypothesis.

Several important points about statistical hypothesis tests must be noted. First, α and β are not the probabilities of hypotheses, nor are they the unconditional probabilities of committing the associated errors. In frequentist statistics, the probability that H_0 is true is either 0 or 1 (we just do not know which), and the unconditional probability of committing a Type I error is either α or 0 (we do not know which). In the frequentist view, stating that “ H_0 has a 25% chance of being true” is meaningless with regard to inference.

Second, the simpler hypothesis, that is, the statistical model that has fewer parameters and is contained within the other as a special case is usually designated as the null hypothesis, for reasons of mathematical convenience. The sampling distributions of test statistics under the null hypothesis in such situations are often easy to derive or approximate.

Third, statistical theory accords no special distinction between the null and alternative hypotheses, other than the difference by which the probabilities α and β are set. The hypotheses are just two statistical models, and the test procedure partitions the sample space (the collection of all possible samples) into two sets: the set for which the null model is selected, and the set for which the alternative is selected.

Fourth, the concordance of the statistical hypothesis with a scientific hypothesis is not a given, but is part of the craft of scientific investigation. Just because an investigator ran numbers through PROC this-or-that does not mean that the investigator has proved anything to anyone. The statistical hypothesis test can enter into scientific arguments in many different ways, and weaving the statistical results effectively into a body of scientific evidence is a difficult skill to master. Ecologists who have become gun-shy about hypothesis testing after reading a lot of

hand-wringing about the misuse of null hypotheses and significance testing will find the discussions of Underwood (1990) and Mayo (1996) more constructive.

In our stream example, the hypothesis test is constructed as follows. The likelihood function under the null hypothesis is compared to the maximized likelihood function under the alternative hypothesis. The likelihood function under the null hypothesis is Eq. 1 evaluated at $\mu = \mu_0$ ($= 48$) and $\sigma^2 = 36$. The maximized likelihood function under the alternative hypothesis is Eq. 1 evaluated at $\mu = \hat{\mu} = \bar{x} = 50.6$ and $\sigma^2 = 36$. The likelihood ratio statistic, $L(\mu_0, \sigma^2)/L(\hat{\mu}, \sigma^2)$, or a monotone function of the likelihood ratio such as

$$G^2 = -2 \ln \left[L(\mu_0, \sigma^2) / L(\hat{\mu}, \sigma^2) \right]$$

forms the basis of the test. High values of the test statistic G^2 favor the alternative hypothesis, while low values favor the null. The decision whether to reject the null in favor of the alternative will be based on whether the test statistic exceeds a *critical value* or cutoff point. The critical value is determined by α and the statistical sampling distribution of the test statistic.

A well-known result, first derived by S. S. Wilks (1938), provides the approximate sampling distribution of G^2 for many different statistical models. If the null hypothesis is true, then G^2 has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom, under hypothetical repeated sampling. (The degrees of freedom in Wilks' result is the number of independent parameters in H_1 minus the number of independent parameters estimated in H_0 , or $1 - 0 = 1$ in our example.) Using this result, one would reject the null hypothesis if G^2 exceeded $\chi_{\alpha}^2(1)$, the $100(1 - \alpha)$ th percentile of a chi-square(1) distribution ($\chi_{0.05}^2(1) \approx 3.843$). Because our example involves observations from the mathematically convenient normal distribution, the sampling distribution can be calculated exactly. Letting $Z = (\bar{X} - \mu_0) / \sqrt{\sigma^2/n}$, the expression for G^2 can be algebraically rearranged (using the $+\bar{X} - \bar{X}$ trick again; the upper case \bar{X} reminds us that hypothetical repeated sampling is being considered):

$$G^2 = Z^2 .$$

Because Z has a standard normal distribution, the chi-square result for G^2 is exact (square of a standard normal has a chi-square(1) distribution). The decision to reject can be based on the chi-square percentile, or equivalently on whether $|Z|$ exceeds $z_{\alpha/2}$, the $100(1 - \alpha/2)$ th percentile of the standard normal distribution ($z_{0.025} \approx 1.960$).

For the stream example, the attained value of Z is $z = (50.6 - 48) / \sqrt{36/10} \approx 1.37$. For $\alpha = 0.05$, the critical value of 1.96 is not exceeded. We conclude that the value $\mu_0 = 48$ is a plausible value for μ ; there is not convincing evidence otherwise. The *P-value*, or attained significance level, is the probability that Z for a hypothetical sample would be more extreme than the attained value z , under the null model. From the normal distribution, $P[|Z| > 1.37] = P \approx 0.17$. If the test statistic has exceeded the critical value, then also P will be less than α .

Confidence intervals and hypothesis tests are two sides of the same coin. A confidence interval (CI) for μ can be defined in terms of a hypothesis test: it is the set of all values of μ_0 for which the null hypothesis $H_0: \mu = \mu_0$ would not be rejected in favor of the

alternative $H_1: \mu \neq \mu_0$. A CI can be considered a set of plausible values for μ . The sets produced under hypothetical repeated sampling would contain the true value of μ an average of $100(1 - \alpha)\%$ of the time. The form of the interval is here

$$\left(\bar{x} - z_{\alpha/2} \sqrt{\sigma^2/n}, \bar{x} + z_{\alpha/2} \sqrt{\sigma^2/n} \right).$$

The realized CI for the stream example, with $\alpha = 0.05$, is

$$(50.6 - 1.96\sqrt{36/10}, 50.6 + 1.96\sqrt{36/10}) = (46.9, 54.3).$$

Note that under the frequentist interpretation of the interval, it is not correct to say that $P[46.9 < \mu < 54.3] = 1 - \alpha$. The interval either contains μ or it does not; we do not know which. The concept of a CI can be likened to a playing a game of horseshoes in which you throw the horseshoe over a wall that conceals the stake. Your long-run chance of getting a “ringer” might be 95%, but once an individual horseshoe is thrown, it is either a ringer or it is not (you just do not know which).

There are *one-sided* hypothesis tests, in which the form of the alternative hypothesis might be $H_1: \mu \geq \mu_0$ (or instead \leq), and associated one-sided confidence intervals (see Bain and Engelhardt 1992). The one-sided test or CI might be more appropriate for the stream example, if for instance the data are collected to provide warning as to whether an upper level μ_0 of Cu concentration has been exceeded.

σ^2 unknown

Realistic modeling studies must confront the problem of additional unknown parameters. Sometimes the whole model is of interest, and no particular parameters are singled out for special attention. Other times, as in the stream example, one or more parameters are the focus, and the remaining unknown parameters (“nuisance parameters”) are estimated out of necessity.

The parameter σ^2 in the normal model is the perennial example in the statistics literature of a nuisance parameter. That the estimate of μ becomes more uncertain when σ^2 must also be estimated was first recognized by W. S. Gosset (Student 1908). The problem of nuisance parameters was refined by numerous mathematical/statistical investigators after the likelihood concept became widely known (Cox and Hinkley 1974 is a standard modern reference).

In frequentist statistics, a leading approach is to estimate σ^2 (or any other nuisance parameter) just like one would estimate μ . The approach has the advantage of helping subsidiary studies of the data; for instance, in a monitoring study (such as the stream example), one might have an additional interest in whether or not σ^2 has changed. In this case σ^2 is not really a nuisance, but rather an important component of the real focus of study: the model itself.

For estimation, the likelihood function (Eq. 1) is regarded as a joint function of the two unknowns, μ and σ^2 . The ML estimates of μ and σ^2 are those values which jointly maximize the likelihood (Eq. 1) or log-likelihood (Eq. 2). A simple calculus exercise sets partial derivatives of $\ln L(\mu, \sigma^2)$ with respect to μ and σ^2 simultaneously equal to zero. The resulting ML estimates are:

$$\hat{\mu} = \bar{x},$$

$$\hat{\sigma}^2 = \frac{(n-1)}{n} s^2.$$

Note that the ML estimate of σ^2 is not the sample variance ($n-1$ in denominator). An estimate that adjusts for a small-sample bias is

$$\tilde{\sigma}^2 = s^2.$$

The ML estimate of σ^2 , however, has smaller mean-squared error in small samples; $\hat{\sigma}^2$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^2$ are virtually identical in large samples.

Hypothesis tests and confidence intervals for μ again revolve around the likelihood ratio statistic. With additional unknown parameters in the model, the statistic compares the the likelihood function maximized (over the remaining parameters) under the null hypothesis, $H_0: \mu = \mu_0$, with the likelihood maximized (over all the parameters including μ) under the alternative hypothesis $H_1: \mu \neq \mu_0$. When $\mu = \mu_0$, the value of σ^2 that maximizes $\ln L(\mu_0, \sigma^2)$ (Eq. 2) is

$$\hat{\sigma}_0^2 = \frac{(n-1)}{n} s^2 + (\mu_0 - \bar{x})^2 = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \mu_0)^2.$$

The (log-) likelihood ratio statistic is

$$G^2 = -2 \ln \left[\frac{L(\mu_0, \hat{\sigma}_0^2)}{L(\hat{\mu}, \hat{\sigma}^2)} \right],$$

where in the brackets is the ratio of the null and alternative likelihoods, evaluated at the ML estimates. With some algebraic rearrangement (the $+ \bar{x} - \bar{x}$ trick again), G^2 becomes

$$G^2 = -n \ln \left(\frac{\hat{\sigma}^2}{\hat{\sigma}_0^2} \right) = -n \ln \left[\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2 + n(\bar{x} - \mu_0)^2} \right]$$

$$= -n \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 + \frac{t^2}{n-1}} \right),$$

where

$$t = \frac{\bar{x} - \mu_0}{\sqrt{s^2/n}}$$

is recognized as Student's t-statistic. The hypothesis test can be based on the asymptotic chi-square(1) sampling distribution of G^2 , or better yet, on the known exact distribution of $T = (\bar{X} - \mu_0)/\sqrt{S^2/n}$. One rejects $H_0: \mu = \mu_0$ in favor of $H_1: \mu \neq \mu_0$ if $|T|$ exceeds $t_{\alpha/2, n-1}$, the $100[1 - (\alpha/2)]$ th percentile of the Student's t-distribution with $n - 1$ degrees of freedom.

For the stream example with $\mu_0 = 48$, the attained value of T is $t = (50.6 - 48)/\sqrt{25/10} \approx 1.64$. For $\alpha = 0.05$, the critical value of $t_{0.025, 9} \approx 2.262$ is not exceeded by $|t|$, and we conclude that the value $\mu_0 = 48$ is a plausible value for μ . The P -value for the test is obtained from Student's t-distribution (9 degrees of freedom): $P[|T| > 1.64] = P \approx 0.14$.

Confidence intervals, as before, can be defined by inverting the hypothesis test. The values of μ_0 for which H_0 is not rejected, that is for which $|T| \leq t_{\alpha/2, n-1}$, make up the interval

$$\left(\bar{x} - t_{\alpha/2, n-1} \sqrt{s^2/n}, \bar{x} + t_{\alpha/2, n-1} \sqrt{s^2/n} \right).$$

This constitutes a $100(1 - \alpha)\%$ CI for μ . The interval also represents a *profile likelihood* CI. For a range of fixed values of μ_0 , $L(\mu_0, \sigma^2)$ is maximized (over σ^2 values) and compared to $L(\hat{\mu}, \hat{\sigma}^2)$ (the maximized likelihood under the model H_1). The set of μ_0 values for which $G^2 \leq k$, where k is some fixed constant, is a profile likelihood CI. In the above interval, $k = n \ln \left[1 + \frac{(t_{\alpha/2, n-1})^2}{n-1} \right]$, the critical value of the likelihood ratio test using the exact Student's t-distribution. In non-normal models, k is typically a percentile of the chi-square distribution used to approximate the sampling distribution of G^2 . Frequently for such models, repeated numerical maximizations are necessary for calculating profile likelihood intervals.

The stream example gives a 95% CI of

$$(50.6 - 2.262\sqrt{25/10}, 50.6 + 2.262\sqrt{25/10}) = (47.0, 54.2).$$

This CI represents a range of plausible values for μ , taking into account the uncertainty of estimation of σ^2 .

Much of standard introductory statistics, in the form of t-tests, tests of independence in contingency tables, analysis of variance, and regression, can be understood in the context of the above concepts. In particular, normal linear models (analysis of variance and regression) are formed by allowing μ to be reparameterized as

$$\mu = \beta_0 + \beta_1 r_1 + \beta_2 r_2 + \dots + \beta_m r_m,$$

where $\beta_0, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_m$ are unknown parameters and r_1, r_2, \dots, r_m are values of covariates (indicator variables or predictor variables).

Model evaluation

Once the point estimates are calculated, tests are performed, and confidence intervals are reported, the job is not done. The estimates and tests have valid sample space statistical properties only if the model is a reasonable approximation of how the original data arose. *Diagnostics* are routine checks of model adequacy. Diagnostics include examining residuals (in this case, $x_i - \hat{\mu}$) for approximate normality via normal quantile-quantile plots or tests, tests for outliers or influential values, and graphical plotting of model and data. The model implicit in the statistical analysis is to be questioned, and if found wanting, some other model might be necessary.

Such model checking, it must be noted, involves sample space properties of the model. If the correct model is being used, observations of the process are expected to be in *control*, that is, within the usual boundaries of model-predicted variability. A process out-of-control is indicated by wayward observations and calls for further investigation. This is a standard principle of *quality control*, which involves the systematic and routine use of statistical models to monitor variability and is used in virtually all modern manufacturing processes (Vardeman 1994).

WHAT IS BAYESIANISM?

“*What he and I are arguing about is different interpretations of data.*”

—Duane Gish, in an evolution/creation debate

The concepts of frequentism revolve around hypothetical repetitions of a random process. The probabilities in a frequentist problem are probabilities on a sample space. The quantity α , for instance, is the probability that the sample will land in a particular region of sample space, given that a particular model describes the process.

In Bayesian statistics, sample space probabilities are not used. Instead, probability has a different meaning. Probability in Bayesian statistics is an investigator's personal measure of the *degree of belief* about the value of an unknown quantity such as a parameter.

Let us again turn to the example problem. We have a sample of 10 observations of Cu concentration in a stream. We assume that these observations can be modeled as if they arose independently from a normal distribution with a mean of μ and a variance of σ^2 . Again, we treat separately the cases of σ^2 known and σ^2 unknown.

σ^2 known

There is only one unknown parameter, μ . The Bayesian formulates his/her beliefs about the value of μ into a *prior probability distribution*. The prior distribution has pdf denoted by

$g(\mu)$ and cdf given by

$$G(\mu) = \int_{-\infty}^{\mu} g(v) dv .$$

The form of $g(\mu)$ must be specified completely by the investigator. There are various ways to do this. One way is to “elicit” such a distribution by determining the odds the investigator would give for betting on various values of μ .

The subsequent formulas work out algebraically if we assume that the form of $g(\mu)$ is a normal pdf with a mean of θ and a variance of τ^2 , with the values of θ and τ^2 to be elicited. However, more complicated distributional forms nowadays are possible to implement in practice. Skewed gamma-type distributions or curves fitted to the investigator's odds declarations can be used.

Our investigator in this example works for the mining company upstream. This investigator would give one-to-three odds that the Cu concentration is below 18.65, and three-to-one odds that the Cu concentration is below 21.35. If the 25th and the 75th percentiles of a normal distribution are set at 18.65 and 21.35 respectively, then solving

$$G(18.65) = 0.25$$

$$G(21.35) = 0.75$$

simultaneously gives

$$\theta \approx 20,$$

$$\tau^2 \approx 4.$$

It is worth pausing a moment to reflect on the prior. It is not claimed that μ is a random variable. Indeed, μ is a fixed quantity, and the objective is to estimate its value. Rather, μ is an *unknown* quantity, and *personal beliefs about μ can be represented as if they follow the laws of probability*. This is because the odds that the investigator would give for the value of μ increase smoothly from 0 for values of $\mu < -\infty$, to $+\infty$ for values of $\mu < +\infty$. Such increase and range are the precise properties of a cdf written in terms of odds:

$$G(\mu)/[1 - G(\mu)].$$

Data, in the Bayesian view, modify beliefs. The data enter the inference through the likelihood function. The likelihood function is as central to Bayesian inference as it is to frequentist inference. However, its interpretation is different under the two outlooks.

In Bayesian statistics, the likelihood arises as a conditional probability model. It is the joint pdf of the process, evaluated at the data, *given values of the unknown parameters*. In other words, the set of beliefs about all possible values of μ and all possible outcomes of the data-production process are contained in a joint pdf, say $h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, \mu)$. The likelihood function (Eq. 1) is the conditional pdf of x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n given μ :

$$\begin{aligned}
L(\mu, \sigma^2) &= (\sigma^2 2\pi)^{-n/2} \exp \left\{ - (2\sigma^2)^{-1} \left[(n-1)s^2 + n(\mu - \bar{x})^2 \right] \right\} \\
&= h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu).
\end{aligned}$$

The frequentist simply regards the likelihood as a function of possible values of μ , with no underlying probability attached to the μ values.

What is sought in Bayesian statistics is the probability distribution of beliefs after such beliefs have been modified by data. This distribution is known as the *posterior* distribution and is the distribution of μ given the data, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n . Bayes' theorem in probability is a mathematical result about joint and conditional probability distributions that is not in dispute between frequentists and Bayesians. In the present context, the theorem is used to write the pdf of μ given x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , denoted $g(\mu | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$, in terms of the the likelihood function and the prior distribution:

$$g(\mu | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = Ch(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu)g(\mu).$$

The quantity C is a *normalization constant* that causes the area under $g(\mu | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ to be equal to 1. It is:

$$C = \frac{1}{\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu)g(\mu) d\mu}.$$

The calculation of C is the mathematical and computational crux of Bayesian methods. Obtaining C is algebraically straightforward for the forms of the prior and the likelihood selected in our stream example. The quantity μ appears quadratically in the exponential function in the product $h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu)g(\mu)$, and so C is related to the integral of a normal distribution. The end result is that the posterior pdf is that of a normal distribution:

$$g(\mu | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = (\tau_1^2 2\pi)^{-\frac{1}{2}} \exp \left[- (\mu - \theta_1)^2 / (2\tau_1^2) \right],$$

where the mean θ_1 is

$$\theta_1 = \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau^2 n} \right) \theta + \left(\frac{\tau^2 n}{\sigma^2 + \tau^2 n} \right) \bar{x},$$

and the variance τ_1^2 is

$$\tau_1^2 = \frac{\sigma^2 \tau^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau^2 n}.$$

The mean θ_1 is a weighted combination of the prior mean, θ , and the sample mean of the data, \bar{x} . As the sample size increases, the weight on the prior mean decreases, approaching zero in the limit as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

The point estimate of μ in Bayesian statistics is usually taken to be the expected value of the posterior distribution: θ_1 . This estimate can be regarded as a *prediction* of the value of μ . The posterior distribution, like the prior, represents degree of belief. The prior prediction was θ , and the posterior prediction θ_1 quantifies how the prior prediction has been modified by the advent of the data. In our stream example, the ten data points changed the prior prediction of $\theta = 20$ into the posterior prediction of $\theta_1 \approx 36.1$. The variance of the posterior is $\tau_1^2 \approx 1.89$.

One should note that the Bayesian point estimate of μ is *biased* in the frequentist sense. If hypothetical repetitions of the sampling process are imagined (for the same Bayesian with the same prior), the frequency distribution of the Bayesian's estimates would be off-center from μ . If we denote by Θ_1 the sample-space random version of the point estimate θ_1 , then the expected value of Θ_1 over the sample space is

$$\begin{aligned} E(\Theta_1) &= \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau^2 n} \right) \theta + \left(\frac{\tau^2 n}{\sigma^2 + \tau^2 n} \right) E(\bar{X}) \\ &= \mu + \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau^2 n} \right) (\theta - \mu). \end{aligned}$$

The amount of bias is seen to be the difference $\theta - \mu$ (bias in the prior) multiplied by the Bayesian weight. In the stream example, if the null hypothesis ($\mu = 48$) were true, the amount of bias in the Bayesian estimate is about -13.3 ; this Bayesian's long-run frequency distribution of estimates would be centered at a distance more than twice the standard deviation ($\sigma = 6$) below the true value of μ .

The posterior distribution also yields to the Bayesian information about the uncertainty with which to regard the prediction. One way to summarize this uncertainty is the Bayesian belief interval, formed by taking an interval containing $100(1 - \alpha)\%$ of the probability in the posterior density. The smallest such interval is the *highest probability region* (HPR). The HPR is analogous to the confidence interval of frequentist statistics, but has a much different interpretation. The Bayesian asserts that there is a 95% chance that μ is within a given 95% HPR, because probability represents belief on a parameter space (all possible values of μ). The frequentist cannot assert that there is a 95% chance that μ is within a given 95% CI, because probability to a frequentist represents long-run frequency on a sample space (all possible outcomes of the sample). With our normal model, the HPR region is the interval centered at the posterior mean, θ_1 , containing $100(1 - \alpha)\%$ of the area under the posterior density:

$$\left(\theta_1 - z_{\alpha/2} \sqrt{\tau_1^2}, \theta_1 + z_{\alpha/2} \sqrt{\tau_1^2} \right).$$

In the stream example, the 95% HPR is (33.4, 38.8), which is quite different from the 95% confidence interval (46.9, 54.3) obtained under the frequentist approach. However, as the

sample size becomes large and the data swamp the prior beliefs, the HPR in this normal-based example converges rapidly to the confidence interval. In other words, the Bayesian and the frequentist will report essentially the same interval estimate for μ if good data are available. While this asymptotic behavior of HPRs is typical for standard statistical models, it is somehow not a comforting point of agreement for Bayesians and frequentists, in that the interpretation of the two intervals is so different. Also, for some models and circumstances, the rate of convergence of the Bayesian HPR to the frequentist CI is alarmingly slow (see σ^2 unknown, below).

A key aspect of Bayesianism is adherence to the *likelihood principle*. The principle states that sample space probabilities are irrelevant to inferences about unknown parameters. The data only influence the inferences through the likelihood function. This principle is embodied in the posterior density, $g(\mu|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$. All inferences about μ are contained in the posterior density and are phrased in terms of probabilities on parameter space. Only the data actually observed appear in the posterior (via the likelihood function); no hypothetical data, such as a critical value for \bar{x} , or probabilities of hypothetical data, such as P -values or Type I & II error probabilities, are considered in the conclusions about μ .

Bayesians are adamant on this point (Lindley 1990, Berger and Berry 1988). Type I & II error probabilities and P -values are probabilities of “data that didn’t happen,” and Bayesians question what relevance such quantities could possibly have for conclusions about a parameter.

The use of sample space probabilities in frequentist statistics has surprising, and to Bayesians, undesirable consequences. Foremost is the dependence of the statistical conclusions on the *stopping rule* of the experiment. For instance, were the stream samples drawn sequentially, one by one, until some threshold high or low value of \bar{x} was attained? Or, were simply ten samples drawn? Or, did the investigator actually draw 11 samples, but drop one jar accidentally?

σ^2 unknown

Bayesians claim that the treatment of nuisance parameters within the Bayesian framework is one of the key advantages of their approach. Let us examine how this claim operates in practice.

With σ^2 unknown, the concept behind the Bayesian analysis is straightforward. The posterior distribution for μ , represented by the pdf $g(\mu|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$, is still sought. First, though, beliefs about μ and σ^2 must be summarized in a joint prior distribution for μ and σ^2 . So-represented, the beliefs are entered into the mix with the likelihood function (Eq. 1), and the posterior distribution for μ is then obtained (at least in principle) with Bayes' theorem.

The joint prior pdf for μ and σ^2 , denoted $g(\mu, \sigma^2)$, is that of a bivariate continuous distribution. The distribution would presumably be defined for positive real values of σ^2 , and real (or positive real) values of μ . A joint distribution in general would contain some correlation between μ and σ^2 . Rarely, however, can any dependence of beliefs about μ on those about σ^2 be acknowledged or elicited. Consequently, the form often proposed for the joint pdf is a

product of univariate prior pdfs for μ and σ^2 :

$$g(\mu, \sigma^2) = g_1(\mu)g_2(\sigma^2).$$

Here $g_1(\mu)$ is a pdf for μ (such as the normal pdf in the σ^2 -known case above), and $g_2(\sigma^2)$ is a pdf for σ^2 . The form of $g_2(\sigma^2)$ selected by the investigator could be a gamma, reciprocal gamma, lognormal, or other distribution on the positive real line. The product form of $g(\mu, \sigma^2)$ assumes (or implies) that the prior “information” about μ is independent of that of σ^2 .

With the elicited joint prior in hand, the analysis proceeds via Bayes' theorem. The joint posterior pdf for μ and σ^2 is proportional to the product of the prior pdf and the likelihood function:

$$g(\mu, \sigma^2 | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = C_1 h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu, \sigma^2) g_1(\mu) g_2(\sigma^2).$$

The likelihood function is again written as $h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu, \sigma^2)$ to emphasize its role as a conditional pdf. The constant C_1 is the normalization constant given by

$$C_1 = \frac{1}{\int \int h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu, \sigma^2) g_1(\mu) g_2(\sigma^2) d\mu d\sigma^2},$$

where the integrals are over the ranges of μ and σ^2 in the prior pdfs. Some remarks about the daunting process of obtaining C_1 are given below. In principle, the joint posterior pdf $g(\mu, \sigma^2 | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ contains all the beliefs about μ and σ^2 , updated by the data x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n . Moreover, the nuisance parameter σ^2 is vanquished by integrating it out of the joint posterior to get the posterior marginal distribution for μ :

$$g(\mu | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = \int_0^\infty g(\mu, \sigma^2 | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) d\sigma^2.$$

This posterior pdf for μ reflects all beliefs about μ after the advent of the data. The pdf could be used, for instance, to obtain an HPR for μ , just as was done in the σ^2 -known case above.

The technical difficulties with the analysis reside in evaluating the multiple integrals for C_1 and in integrating out σ^2 to get the marginal posterior for μ . For nearly all forms of prior distributions $g_1(\mu)$ and $g_2(\sigma^2)$, the integrals must be performed numerically. Up until the middle 1980s, the lack of symbolic results for the integrals were the death knell for Bayesianism, because methods for reliably evaluating multi-dimensional integrals were poorly developed. However, clever simulation methods were devised for these integrals; the methods exploit the fact that the integrals are essentially expected values of functions with respect to the prior distributions. Papers on Bayesian analyses in the statistics literature subsequently exploded in number, starting in the late 1980s. The simulation methods have been for a decade a part of the hidden culture of statisticians, described tersely or implicitly in dense mathematical terms in the statistics literature, but are now receiving excellent expositions for broader scientific audiences (for instance, Robert and Casella 1999). Investigators must be warned, however, that the numerical methods at present involve heavy computer programming efforts, post-calculus

statistics knowledge, and sometimes days of computer time; the methods are not ready yet for routine use by busy laboratory or field scientists.

What if the investigator does not really have, or is unwilling to admit, any prior beliefs about σ^2 ? Bayesian writers have proposed “uninformative priors” for such situations. Use of these priors has also been advocated for situations in which investigators disagree about the prior information and require a relatively “neutral” prior for mediation (Lee 1989). However, there are different approaches to specifying neutral priors. One is the *maximum entropy* approach (Jaynes 1968). The investigator in the maximum entropy approach specifies only numerical summaries of the prior distribution, such as the mean, or the mean and variance both. The prior is then the distribution that maximizes the “entropy content” (expected value of $-\ln g_2(\sigma^2)$) of the prior while retaining the numerical summaries. If the mean of the prior for σ^2 is fixed at ϕ , for example (and the range is taken to be the positive real line), the maximum entropy criterion yields an exponential distribution for σ^2 with pdf $g_2(\sigma^2) = (1/\phi) \exp(-\sigma^2/\phi)$. Another approach is that of the *uniform prior*: the beliefs about σ^2 are taken to have a uniform distribution. This type of prior is sometimes called an *improper prior* because it is not integrable over the entire range of the parameter (here, the positive real line). Actually, the uniform distribution for σ^2 is taken to range properly from 0 to, say, some large unspecified number γ . The prior pdf (a constant, $1/\gamma$) is then integrable, and the value of γ , if large, turns out to affect the calculations about μ only negligibly.

A conceptual problem with uninformative priors is that ignorance about σ^2 , expressed in an uninformative prior distribution for σ^2 , does not translate into ignorance about a function of σ^2 , say $\ln \sigma^2$. For instance, if σ^2 has a uniform distribution on the interval from 0 to γ , then the distribution of $\ln \sigma^2$ is non-uniform. A uniform prior distribution for σ^2 leads to a different posterior distribution for μ than when a uniform prior for $\ln(\sigma^2)$ is used. This disparity has motivated some Bayesians to investigate how to choose the scale upon which their ignorance is to be expressed. Textbook discussions of such investigations gravitate to scales which allow convenient algebra, i.e., scales for which the problematic integrals noted above can be evaluated symbolically (e.g. Lee 1989).

So that some numerical results might be displayed for the stream example without having to refer to a workstation, let us employ such a scale for σ^2 . Suppose the prior distribution for $\ln(\sigma^2)$ is taken to be a uniform distribution on some large, unspecified interval of the real line. Then, from the transformation rule for distributions (Rice 1995), the prior distribution for σ^2 has a pdf of the form $g_2(\sigma^2) = C_2/\sigma^2$, where C_2 is a constant. This prior is improper on the entire positive real line, but again it will be thought of as ranging from 0 to some large but unspecified upper value. The joint prior distribution for μ and σ^2 becomes, assuming independence of beliefs about the two parameters, the product of marginal prior pdfs:

$$g(\mu, \sigma^2) = C_2 \left(\sigma^2 \sqrt{\tau^2 2\pi} \right)^{-1} \exp \left[-(\mu - \theta)^2 / (2\tau^2) \right].$$

Substituting this joint prior into the expression for the posterior distribution for μ and σ^2 above, and using the normal likelihood function (Eq. 1) for $h(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n | \mu, \sigma^2)$, one obtains

$$g(\mu, \sigma^2 | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = C_1 (\tau^2)^{-\frac{1}{2}} (2\pi)^{-\frac{n+1}{2}} (\sigma^2)^{-\left(\frac{n}{2}+1\right)} \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2\sigma^2} (n-1)s^2 - \frac{1}{2\sigma^2} n(\mu - \bar{x})^2 - \frac{1}{2\tau^2} (\mu - \theta)^2 \right\}.$$

This posterior pdf for μ and σ^2 is a dome-shaped function reflecting the joint beliefs about the two parameters after the advent of the data. The nuisance parameter is now eliminated in an act which is to Bayesians conceptually as well as algebraically symbolic. The terms in the posterior involving σ^2 are (thanks to our selection of prior) in the form $(\sigma^2)^{-a} \exp(-b/\sigma^2)$. The form is like a reciprocal gamma pdf and yields $b^{-(a-1)}\Gamma(a-1)$ when integrated over the positive real line. Thus:

$$\begin{aligned} g(\mu | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) &= \int_0^\infty g(\mu, \sigma^2 | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) d\sigma^2 \\ &= C_3 \left[\frac{(n-1)s^2}{2} + \frac{n(\mu - \bar{x})^2}{2} \right]^{-n/2} \exp \left[-\frac{(\mu - \theta)^2}{2\tau^2} \right] \\ &= C_3 \left[1 + \frac{t^2}{(n-1)} \right]^{-n/2} \exp \left[-\frac{(\mu - \theta)^2}{2\tau^2} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Here $t = \sqrt{n}(\bar{x} - \mu)/s$ is the t -statistic that would be used by frequentists to test a particular value of μ as a null hypothesis. The posterior distribution for μ is seen to be the prior normal pdf for μ weighted by the pdf of a Student's t -distribution. Rather awkwardly, the normalization constant C_3 cannot be evaluated symbolically, and so to obtain a point estimate or HPR the workstation must be booted up even for this simple illustrative example. Fortunately, the numerical integration for one dimension is straightforward.

The 95% HPR resulting for the stream example (using, as will be recalled, $\bar{x} = 50.6$, $s^2 = 25.0$, $n = 10$, $\theta = 20.0$, $\tau^2 = 4.0$) is approximately (17.3, 25.3). Recall that the frequentist 95% confidence interval based on the Student's t -distribution was (47.0, 54.2). In the previous case in which σ^2 was taken as a known constant ($\sigma^2 = 36$), the HPR (33.4, 38.8) was considerably closer to the corresponding frequentist confidence interval (46.9, 54.3). Apparently, when σ^2 is unknown the preponderance of weight remains in this example on the prior; the HPR is remarkably insensitive to the data. While the frequentist results take at face value the estimate, s^2 , of σ^2 , the Bayesian results in the face of lack of knowledge about σ^2 contain an inherent preference for beliefs about μ over data. Indeed, one can ask just how much evidence is necessary for the Bayesian here to start noticing the data. What if the values of \bar{x} and s^2 from the stream had resulted from larger sample sizes? Suppose the value of n is increased in the posterior pdf for μ above, while keeping all the quantities fixed at the same values. At $n = 40$, prior beliefs are still heavily weighted: the HPR is (21.8, 30.0). A strangely

sudden change of heart occurs between 60 and 65 observations. At $n = 60$, the posterior pdf for μ has developed a prominent “shoulder” near $\mu = 50$, and the upper end of the HPR has started to reach upward; the HPR is (26.1, 40.1). The frequentist 95% confidence interval for $n = 60$ is by contrast only two units wide: (49.3, 51.9). At $n = 63$, the posterior pdf for μ is bimodal, one peak influenced by the prior, and one peak influenced by the data; the HPR is (28.8, 47.1). By $n = 65$, the data-peak has grown taller than the prior peak, and the HPR is (31.2, 48.3). By $n = 70$, the laggard lower end of the HPR has finally entered the 40’s; the HPR is (42.7, 49.0).

If $\mu = 48$ were cause for alarm, the frequentist scientist would have detected this state of affairs with as few as 10 observations. It would take at least 65 observations before our Bayesian, to whom beliefs are evidence on equal footing with data, would sound a Cu pollution warning.

DISCUSSION

Beliefs

It should be evident from the above example that Bayesian and frequentist statistics arise from different views about science. In Bayesian statistics, beliefs are the currency traded among investigators. Beliefs are evidence. Data are used to modify beliefs.

“Beliefs” is not necessarily a four-letter word. In Bayesian statistics, nothing precludes the prior density being “rationally” constructed based on common sense information. Indeed, investigators frequently encounter situations in which a parameter is not completely unknown. In our stream example, it is known for a fact that the mean Cu concentration μ is not a negative quantity. Is it not possible to account for such knowledge in the analysis?

Frequentists account for such information by building more realistic statistical models. The normal distribution is a mathematical approximation. Real Cu concentrations cannot be negative. In the stream example, if the normal approximation is adequate, negative Cu concentrations are wildly improbable, and a negative μ value would result in an extremely bad model. However, a different distribution model might be required, if, for instance, some concentrations are bunched near zero. Even a new, more realistic model is always subject to questioning, via model evaluation procedures.

Frequentists also use prior information in designing surveys and experiments. For instance, the optimal allocation of samples in a stratified sampling scheme depends on knowing the variances within each stratum (Scheaffer et al. 1996). In addition, selecting a sample size in experimental design depends on the desired power, which in turn depends on the effect size and the variance (Ott 1993). The investigator must have some prior information about the effect size and variance for the design to achieve the desired power.

To the frequentist, though, such prior information is regarded as *suspect*. This is a major departure point from the Bayesians. Frequentists build on prior information tentatively, using sample space variability properties constantly for checking the reliability of the knowledge. Prior information is placed in the likelihood function itself, and is thereby vulnerable to empirical challenge.

Bayesians will cry foul at my rough handling of the Bayesian analysis in the stream example. The selection of the prior mean of $\theta = 20$ by the mining company scientist seems lopsided and biased, cynically calculated to come to a pre-defined conclusion. The scientist is supposed to formulate the prior distribution based on real costs and consequences of being wrong. What if the scientist were forced to deliver on the bet implied by the prior?

It must be remembered, however, that the scientist is employed by the mining company.

First, the real cost to the scientist comes not from being far from the truth, but rather from defeat. The two are not necessarily concordant. The scientist has a real financial stake in defending the mining company's view. If this scientist is not willing, some other scientist will gladly step in and cook the numbers.

Second, the scientist can be wrong, or even deceived. It is quite possible that the scientist's beliefs were genuine. During previous monitoring of the stream, say, Cu concentrations might indeed have hovered around $20 \mu\text{g l}^{-1}$, and the scientist had no reason to believe that today's samples would be different. In this hypothetical scenario, the company had a pollution event, and failed to inform their monitoring group.

Either way, the scientist's beliefs do nothing but contaminate the data analysis. They add no legitimate information to the estimate of Cu concentration.

In fact, for scientists in general there is often a conflict of interest between a scientist's beliefs and the truth. In an ideal world, the scientist who is most successful in discovering truth will be the most successful in building a scientific career. While this circumstance is fortunately common, the real world of scientific careers admits additional complexities (Sindermann 1982). Scientists gain reputations for being advocates of certain theories. Laboratories and research programs grow from mining particular techniques or points of view. A scientist's career is measured in the form of socially warranted visibility: jobs, papers, research grants, citations, and seminar invitations. Young graduate students know one career syndrome well: stubborn adherence of older scientists to old-fashioned explanations and quick dismissal by such scientists of newer ideas before even understanding them. Senior scientists know another career syndrome well: rapid study and advocacy by younger scientists of fashionable new hypotheses that contradict established doctrine and are beyond the frontiers of available data. Everyone in science knows of investigators that took wrong turns toward untenable hypotheses and then spent whole careers defending the hypotheses with contrived arguments. To an individual scientist with a career to build, maintain, and defend, victory, rather than truth, is often the objective.

Scientific method

Is science just a postmodern “way of knowing” after all? At the level of the individual scientist, it would certainly seem so, given all the explicit and implicit social pressures. Science in the postmodern view is a belief system, and scientists achieve success only by participating in a socially warranted system of thought and action, which changes from place to place and year to year.

Bayesianism, through the incorporation of personal beliefs into statistical analyses, accepts the postmodern view of science. A scientist's acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis is a decision made in light of beliefs influenced by costs or utilities. To the Bayesian, science is

improved by explicitly stating, organizing, and acting on beliefs. A scientist summarizes his/her prior beliefs into a probability distribution and modifies those beliefs in a controlled and systematic way with data. Observers are free to quibble with the scientist's prior, or use their own priors and come to their own conclusions. Consensus of beliefs will supposedly emerge as data become more available and priors become diluted. However, the process for this emergence is not clear, for, human nature being what it is, priors will inevitably become more opinionated in the face of growing data. Fundamentally, at the heart of it all, the interpretation of results is in terms of beliefs. In Bayesianism, beliefs are sanctioned, not repudiated.

Modern science, though, has been wildly successful despite the imperfect humans that make up the ranks of scientists, and, incidentally, despite the almost complete absence of Bayesianism in day-to-day scientific life. The postmodern claim that science is socially constructed reality is an intellectual fraud (Sokal and Bricmont 1998). Hydrogen atoms, and the speed of light, are the same in India, Alaska, and the Andromeda galaxy. True, scientists, and groups of scientists, often come to the wrong conclusions. It is the *process* that is responsible for the enormous gains in understanding we have attained, in ecology and in other disciplines. Our understanding does not just jump from one fashionable paradigm to another; it *improves*. Science is like a river that flows mostly forward, but with slow pools and backcurrents here and there. It is the collective process of empirical investigation, involving weeding out of untenable notions and careful checking of working hypotheses, that makes progress possible. The invisible empirical hand of Galileo, the Adam Smith of science, promotes the emergence of reliable knowledge.

Bayesians and postmoderns alike miss the fundamental idea of science. Science is not about beliefs; science is about skepticism.

Science is not about prediction, estimation, making decisions, data collection, or data interpretation. Scientists engage in these activities, but these activities do not constitute science. Science, rather, is about constructing convincing explanations and acquiring reliable knowledge. “Convincing” means a reasoned skeptic is forced, by logic and evidence, to accept the explanation as, at least, a serious contender for the true explanation. “Reliable” means that others can reproduce the results and rely on them for building further explanations. Scientific arguments are aimed at reasoned skeptics. “Reasoned” means open to acknowledging evidence that might contradict prior points of view.

The *scientific method* is a series of logical devices for eliminating or reducing points of reasoned skepticism. One premise of the scientific method is that human judgment is inherently flawed. This is because reasoned skeptics might validly argue in any situation that a scientist's personal beliefs are suspect. Successful scientists seek to counter that criticism by adopting investigative methods that eliminate conscious or unconscious biases. Frequentist analyses are an important tool in the scientific method.

Frequentism accepts only a portion of the postmodern critique. To the frequentist, the actions and behaviors of individual investigators are indeed mired in beliefs. However, to the frequentist, the methods of statistical analysis are set up to discount those beliefs as much as possible. The assumption that a scientist's judgments are not to be trusted has a long history in frequentist statistics, and is expressed in the concepts of design-based sampling, replication,

randomization, experimental design, unbiased estimation, model diagnostics, and explicit stopping rules.

Frequentist statistics adheres to the principles of the scientific method. Experimental subjects are selected at random. Observations are sampled at random. Variability of the process under study is carefully controlled and modeled, so that future investigators can replicate and check the work. In frequentist hypothesis testing, the skeptic's null hypothesis is *assumed* to be true, but unlike the Bayesian's prior, the assumption is just an argumentative device. The assumption is then found to be tenable or untenable under the data. The statistical models used by the investigator are suspect and must have demonstrated reliability and usefulness for future investigators. By the continual modeling of and referral to sample space variability of a data production process, frequentism can not only show that some hypotheses are untenable in a classic Popperian way, but can also establish that other hypotheses are operationally reliable and can serve as the bases for future studies (Mayo 1996).

Evidence

Bayesians claim that scientists long for numerical measures of evidence. If only one could attach, in some reliable way, a number to a hypothesis, indicating the relative weight of evidence for that hypothesis as opposed to others, then scientific conclusions would be clearer and more helpful to policy decisions. Why must we avoid doing what seems natural, that is, stating that the chance hypothesis A is true is $Q\%$?

The answer is that the number is scientifically meaningless, and the price is too high. In Bayesian analyses, the evidentiary number cannot exist except in the personal belief system of the investigator. Neither priors nor likelihood functions can be empirically challenged in the Bayesian scheme, and so personal beliefs are always present to some degree in conclusions. With the postmodern foot in the door, the way is opened for limitless political pressure to influence the weight of evidence. Bayesian statistics might seem like a shot in the arm for a stalled science, but Bayesian science unfortunately fails to convince.

The evidentiary number in Bayesian statistics is likelihood, modified by beliefs. Is it possible to eliminate the belief considerations, while retaining likelihood? Various investigators through the years have proposed statistical approaches which accept the likelihood principle but reject the use of priors (Edwards 1972, Royall 1997). The relative weight of evidence for hypothesis A over hypothesis B is determined by comparing their likelihoods under these schemes.

The likelihood principle eliminates consideration of any sample space events, other than the actual data outcome, as evidence. But likelihood has little absolute meaning by itself, without appeal to sample space properties. One cannot determine from the statement, " $\ln L_A = -43.7$ ", whether A is a viable model or not. One cannot determine from the statement, " $\ln L_A - \ln L_B = 5.8$ ", whether model A is unquestionably better than model B . The viability of a model depends on a variety of things, for instance, on whether it *fits*. A difference in log-likelihoods as big as 5.8 might easily be within the range of variability expected by chance. Without analyses based on hypothetical sample space events, these possibilities cannot be addressed.

Also, the likelihood principle eliminates consideration of stopping rules. Whether the sample size was sequentially determined or fixed, the evidence is the same under the likelihood principle. Unfortunately, we cannot then determine whether or not the investigator's results are unusual under a particular experimental protocol, and consequently we cannot question the likelihood upon which the investigator's conclusions are based. The stopping rule dependence exists because we do not trust the scientist: we insist upon the option of repeating the study to as close a degree as possible.

Finally, the current likelihood-only analyses are developed only for simple hypotheses, that is, for statistical models with no estimated parameters (Royall 1997). Nuisance parameters are simply not treated (but it is a topic under active study and new developments are emerging: see Royall 2000). The practical realities of real scientific problems strongly suggest that likelihood-only methods are not yet ready for prime time.

It should be clear by now that evidence in science is not and should not be a single number. Evidence is a structure of arguments, in which each structural piece survives continual and clever empirical challenges.

Tobacco company science

There is a class of scientific-appearing people that I call unreasoned skeptics. Unreasoned skeptics do not accept the tenets of the scientific method. They view science as an activity of data interpretation either in light of prior beliefs or to maximize certain utilities. Money, power, and influence are the objects of the scientific game. In this they have a decidedly postmodern outlook. Unreasoned skeptics include tobacco company scientists and Biblical creation scientists. It is perhaps fortunate that these professional debaters tend not to know much about statistics, for I fear that they would find Bayesian statistics well-suited for their sponsored disinformation campaigns.

EDUCATION

"I have taken 18 credits of statistics classes, but I still do not understand statistics."

—Ph.D. student in wildlife

The distressed wildlife student confessed the above to me, toward the end of a long, rigorous program of graduate study. The student had taken a succession of graduate statistics "methods" courses, such as regression, analysis of variance, experimental design, nonparametric statistics, and multivariate statistics, virtually the entire "service" offering of the university statistics program, and had worked hard and received near-perfect grades. Yet, the student felt that the subject was still a mystery. My impression, based on twenty years of teaching, research, and consulting in ecological statistics, is that this student's confusion about statistics is not an isolated case, but rather represents the norm in the life sciences. What this student's case illustrates is the sad fact that *the "applied" courses insisted upon for their students by life science educators are designed to perpetuate the confusion*. One can take statistics "methods" courses until the cows come home, and be no nearer to understanding statistics than one is to understanding quantum mechanics.

In this last section of my essay, I offer a prescription for change. It might seem like a digression, but I contend that it is a crucial part of the Bayesian/frequentist problem. Many ecologists have never really been comfortable with statistical concepts (e.g. thinking that a P -value is the probability of a hypothesis, etc.), and this discomfort can be exploited by polemicists.

Ecologists are ill-served by their statistics education. For a science in which statistics is so vital, it is paradoxical that statistics is such a source of insecurity and confusion. It is as if the subject of statistics is a big secret. Ecologists are given glimpses and previews of the subject in their “methods” courses, but the subject itself is never revealed. Shouldn't ecologists instead be trained to wield statistical arguments with strength and confidence?

The topic of statistics could hardly be more important to a science than it is in ecology.

First, ecologists are routinely confronted by nonstandard data. The random mechanisms and sampling schemes encountered in ecology often are not well described by the statistical models underlying “off-the-shelf” statistical methods. I find it ironic that ecologists spend a fair amount of time and journal space arguing about statistics; quantitatively-oriented ecologists even teach statistics and attempt to invent new statistical methods. These are tasks for which ecologists (without the education I discuss below) are by and large untrained. With “methods” courses, one never learns the foundational principles from which statistics methods arise; one merely learns the methods that have already arisen. No amount of “methods” courses and no amount of familiarity with computer packages can compensate for this gap in understanding. In particular, jury-rigged attempts to transfer off-the-shelf analyses to nonstandard situations can result in embarrassment and frequently is the subject of useless controversy.

Second, ecological systems are stochastic. Stochastic models are rapidly becoming an integral part of the very theories and concepts of ecology. Yet, confusion about stochastic models has often marred published ecological discourse. For instance, the density dependence vs. density independence debates, a staple in the ecological literature since the '50s, continue to feature mathematically incorrect statements about persistence, autocorrelation, and statistical tests (see discussion by Dennis and Taper 1994).

I propose that ecologists take less statistics courses. Yes, that is not a typo.

The core of an ecology graduate student's statistical training should be a one-year course sequence in mathematical statistics. The standard “math-stat” course offered at most colleges and universities is an upper division undergraduate course (usually can be taken for graduate credit). It is where the secret is revealed, and by the way is where statisticians commence training their own students. With this course sequence, statistics will be a source of strength and confidence for any ecologist. Though the math-stat sequence is a tough challenge, the ecologist will be rewarded by needing far fewer methods courses in their educations. The usual math-stat sequence, incidentally, gives balanced coverage to both the frequentist and the Bayesian approaches without developing the scientific issues to any great degree (Bain and Engelhardt 1992).

Proper preparation for math-stat is essential. Statistics is a post-calculus subject, and that is the heart of the educational problem. There is no way around this fact. The reduced number of methods courses during the training of a Ph. D. will have to be partially compensated

by thorough undergraduate calculus preparation. This does not mean “business calculus” or even “calculus for life sciences.” This means genuine calculus, taken by scientists and engineers. Genuine calculus should be considered a deficiency in graduate admissions; the one-year math-stat sequence can be undertaken in the first or second year of graduate training.

It will help if math-stat is not the first exposure to statistics. The student who has had the usual undergraduate basic statistics course will be continually amazed in math-stat to discover how unified and powerful are the concepts of statistics.

This basic curriculum, calculus, intro statistics, and math-stat, can be followed by selected “methods” courses of particular interest to the student.

One pleasant surprise to a student taking this curriculum will be that the methods courses are quite easy for someone with math-stat training. Textbooks on many statistics topics become readily accessible for self-study. Imagine reading statistics like one reads biology! Another, perhaps more disconcerting surprise will be that the student will be sought out *constantly* in his/her department by faculty and other grad students as a source of statistical help. The demand for statistics consulting can be overwhelming. But that hints at a third surprise, a very pleasant one indeed: command of statistics greatly enhances employability.

Ecologists-in-training who are particularly interested in theoretical ecology, or who are simply interested in strong prospects for gainful employment as scientists, might consider acquiring a graduate degree in statistics. Our M.S. statistics graduates from the University of Idaho wave at their faculty advisors from their lofty tax brackets.

Ecologists struggling with the Bayesian/frequentist issues will ultimately benefit from greater statistical understanding in general. Statisticians are not going to solve the scientific issues of ecological evidence; ecologists must do that to their own satisfaction. But at their current command level of statistics, ecologists are not ready for the task.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Ecology is a difficult science because of the large variability in ecological systems and the large cost of obtaining good information. It is difficult also because of the sensitive political nature of its scientific questions and the pressing demand for quick answers. However, if ecologists yield to the Bayesians' call for watering down the standards of evidence, the end result will be tobacco company science, not science.

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In Defense of Reverend Bayes. Comment on Dennis

by
Charles E. McCulloch

Even as a dyed-in-the-wool frequentist I must cry foul with Brian Dennis' (BD's) rough treatment of Bayesians. Bayesians do test hypotheses and do calculate quantities very similar to (and in many ways *better* than) confidence intervals, p-values, and standard errors. To say that "Bayesian statistics provides conclusions in the face of incomplete data" is to obfuscate the fact that frequentists always use incomplete data. And BD's stream example is patently slanted towards a frequentist treatment.

I will elaborate on two of these points. Bayesians can calculate the probability that a hypothesis is false. This has a much more straightforward interpretation than the awkward definition of a frequentist p-value and is what many scientists would like to calculate.

BD's stream example is smack in the middle of the frequentist domain: it is easy to envision repeated sampling (even indefinitely) and there is only a single, easily estimated source of variability. But what is BD to do in devising a scientifically defensible conservation plan for an endangered species in the one location in which it remains? We might have some decent mortality data, only a little fecundity data (except perhaps in related species) and only expert opinion on survival if the habitat becomes fragmented. How do we combine these different sources of information and variability in a framework in which the frequentist paradigm is inappropriate? It is a hard problem but not one in which we should bury our heads in the sand.

Even in settings more amenable to frequentist inference the Bayesian paradigm can be attractive. In an area of interest to me, namely maximum likelihood estimation of variance components, how do we deal with setting confidence intervals? Even the large sample distribution of the estimates is an awkward mixture of point masses (as estimates hit the boundary of zero) and chi-square distributions with unknown mixing fractions. And this doesn't even start to deal with the small sample distribution, which cannot be written down in closed form. The Bayesian approach, together with modern computing power, straightforwardly handles this problem, even in small and moderate sized samples.

I must, however, agree with BD on the difficulties of specification of prior distributions. In my mind this is an Achilles' heel of the Bayesian approach. This is especially true in high-dimensional problems, in which the joint distribution of 25 parameters might be needed. As BD emphasizes, the specification is, in many cases, not innocuous and must be treated with care.

That said, prior distributions sometimes capture bonafide expert opinion, not just *personal* beliefs and are a synthesis of data and experience. BD also minimizes much of the current research on default, objective, and robust priors, all of which are intended to deal with the difficulty of personalistic priors. Also, ethical Bayesians invariably do sensitivity analyses to assess the influence of their prior specification.

I agree with BD to be extremely skeptical of the Bayesian approach in ecology. But let us not try to blame the ills of postmodern society and the ignorance of science by

the general populace on the Bayesians. And we should keep in mind situations where the Bayes paradigm is attractive and likely to be effective.

As regards BD's suggestion as to how to educate ecologists I say get with the program. Statistics minors at Cornell (a popular minor for ecologists) have, for over 20 years, been required to take a theory of probability and a theory of statistics course. To this is added a matrix algebra or modeling course as well as the usual yearlong data analysis and methods sequence. It makes an ecosystem of difference.

STATISTICS AND SCIENCE, OBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH: COMMENTS ON DENNIS 2000

Aaron M. Ellison
Center for Environmental Literacy
and
Department of Biological Sciences
Mount Holyoke College
South Hadley, MA 01075-6418

phone: 413-538-2110
fax: 413-538-2548
e-mail: aellison@mtholyoke.edu

I comment on three substantive issues raised by Dennis (2000): (1) the scientific method; (2) differences between Bayesian and frequentist statistics; and (3) statistical education for ecologists. I draw inspiration for this essay from the writings of Neil Postman (e.g., Postman and Weingartner 1969, Postman 1995), Paul Feyerabend (1975, 1978, 1987) and David Orr (1992), who, being firmly rooted in the postmodernist camp, provide valuable insights about education, science, and society.¹

Scientists construct convincing explanations and acquire reliable knowledge. We do this through rigorous application of “the scientific method”, a device for eliminating or reducing points of reasoned skepticism. All scientists share a common vision that objective truth is “out there”, but because there is a diversity of reasons that we become scientists, we approach that truth in many ways (Feyerabend 1975, 1978). In the end, however, the “collective process of empirical investigation, weeding out of untenable notions, and careful checking of working hypotheses” is independent of frequentist or Bayesian (or other) methods (Galileo had neither to use); that this process leads to *progress* is a core belief of modernism (see footnote 1). Straight-jacketing ourselves to one method, as advocated by Dennis, recalls an observation by Heisenberg (1958): “[w]e have to remember that what we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our methods of questioning”, and may slow that progress, if in fact, it exists. “Tobacco-company science” can benefit by having only one acceptable method of scientific inquiry, and many political decisions, to our collective detriment and in the face of more than adequate scientific evidence, hinge on the distinction between $P = 0.05$ and $P = 0.06$.

¹Dennis’ critique of Bayesian inference is motivated in large measure by a strong aversion to the lapping waves of “popular postmodernism” on the shoals of science, and the impact of feminist theory in the sciences. In reality, Dennis is concerned about the distinction between *relativism* and *objectivism* within the scientific method (see Feyerabend 1987 for an historically-informed, philosophical review). *Postmodernism* is a reaction to *modernism* and denies an unbridled faith in progress (see Cahoon 1996). Dennis further muddies the waters by lumping *deconstructionism*, a method of literary criticism invented by Paul de Man (1989) and Jacques Derrida (1967) with postmodernism. Although many postmodernists are also relativists (see Gross and Levitt 1994) and engage in literary (or scientific) deconstruction, it is possible to be an objective scientist within a postmodern framework, just as it is possible to be a relativist within a modernist framework, and neither need engage in deconstructionism. Einstein and Heisenberg were successful relativist-modernists, whereas I consider Bayesians to be objectivist-postmodernists.

It is worth noting that “science” (and the science of ecology) is not equivalent to truth. Rather (to extend a concept developed by Postman 1995), science is a specialized language and method that we employ to learn about truth (objective reality) and to explain errors (arising from non-scientific, objectively false versions of reality). Similarly, statistics is not science, it is a specialized language and tool that we employ to speak about science and to describe scientific results. Thus, statistics is a language used to interpret another language (science) to learn about truth and explain error. As a plethora of human languages enriches our social lives, so a multiplicity of statistical languages can enrich our understanding of science and bring us closer to understanding reality.

“The” scientific method

Ecologists are preoccupied with the hypothetico-deductive, falsificationist method laid out by Popper (1959), viewed through the lens of statistics developed by Fisher (1922), and Neyman and Pearson (1928), and placed on a pedestal by Platt (1964), Strong (1980), Simberloff (1980), and Peters (1991). When published, the papers by Strong (1980) and Simberloff (1980) were useful and important antidotes to decades of fuzzy thought and story-telling masquerading as ecological science (although there is much useful data in those old papers), but subsequent ossification of hypothetico-deductivist methods in ecology shares much with the spread of gospel by religious disciples blindly following their master. Advances in modern science, including ecology, owe much to the professed use of the hypothetico-deductive, falsificationist method, but in many (most?) instances, it is applied post-hoc to ideas conceived inductively and tested with experiments deliberately designed to address the favored, “alternative” hypothesis. We should not forget that induction, which Popper attempted to toss into the dustbin of scientific history, is still widely used in “real” mathematics, and undergirds most (ecological) modeling activities (Nicholls et al. 1999 is a recent example with real-world policy implications), activities which Dennis does not consider to be science. This is indeed odd, as models are convincing explanations based on reliable knowledge, and often generate falsifiable hypotheses. Feyerabend (1975,

1978), Howson and Urbach (1993), and Schrader-Frechette and McCoy (1993) provide useful antidotes to knee-jerk hypothetico-deductivism, and are recommended reading for all ecologists who want to become more than just producers and curators of ANOVA tables.

The language of science: frequentist and Bayesian statistical inference

I have discussed elsewhere in greater detail some of the contrasts between frequentist and Bayesian inference (Ellison 1996; see Howson and Urbach 1993 for a readable review, and the papers collected by Earman 1983 for a thorough vetting of the philosophical arguments concerning hypothetico-deductivist and Bayesian methods). I only emphasize here that frequentist statistics answer the question “how probable are my data, given my (null) hypothesis?” (i.e., $P(\text{data} | H)$), whereas Bayesian inference answers the question, “how probable is my hypothesis (null or alternative(s)), given my data?” (i.e., $P(H | \text{data})$). Far from asserting that frequentist methods are “an anachronistic yoke impeding ecological progress”, I suggested that Bayesian inference had utility both in ecological research (where it would allow us to use effectively *unbiased* results from previous research, as in the “macroecological” approach advocated by Brown and Maurer [1989, Brown 1999], among others), and more importantly, in expressing degrees of uncertainty in a policy- and decision-making framework. My interest in this topic initially grew out of teaching a course in decision theory, where Bayesian inference is used extensively (e.g., Berger 1985, Smith 1988, Chechile and Carlisle 1991).

Fundamentally, we scientists seek to understand the world around us. We do this by drawing objective conclusions from observations and experiments that also allow for accurate predictions of future events. Frequentist statistics are very useful for drawing objective conclusions from observations and experiments, but are not well-suited for prediction and inference. Bayesian methods are useful for prediction and inference, given objective, *unbiased* data (Bayesian *priors*) from careful observations, controlled experiments, appropriate null hypotheses, and, when necessary, formal elicitation of expert

opinion (unlike, in all respects, the “cooked” example Dennis presents²). For example, whereas clinical trials of new drugs are grounded firmly in frequentist methods, medical diagnosis and consequent improvements in healthcare and longevity owe much to the principles of “specificity” and “sensitivity” that emerge directly from Bayes theorem (e.g., Rosner 2000). Like clinicians who are responsible for the health and well-being of their patients, ecologists would be well-served by using all available tools to understand the mechanics of ecological systems (frequentist analysis) and to predict their responses to future conditions (model selection with or without Bayesian *or* frequentist inference; see for example Burnham and Anderson 1998).

Until recently, ecologists, like statisticians, have had only asymptotically accurate, frequentist methods available in their statistical toolkit. Increasing computational speed allowed for the development and use of exact statistical tests, many of which do not require knowledge of underlying distributions. Further increases in the power of desktop computers, and improved methods of numerical analysis and approximation, have meant that Bayesian software can now be implemented more easily (e.g., Pole et al. 1994, Cook and Broemeling 1995, Albert 1996). Not surprisingly given these tools, a careful examination of assumptions of, and similarities and differences between Bayesian and frequentist inference has led to a greater diversity of approaches in the major statistical journals. Contrary to Dennis’ assertion, practitioners³ of frequentist and Bayesian inference interact and discuss areas of overlap and disagreement (e.g., Pratt 1965, Smith 1984, Efron 1986, 1998, Casella and Berger 1987,

²Dennis’ example examining copper concentrations is cooked in at least two ways. First, the “expert opinion” of the investigator employed by the mining company is clearly biased. Second, and statistically more importantly, Dennis has changed the point-null hypothesis from that presented in the frequentist example ($\mu_0 = 48$) to that presented in the Bayesian example ($\mu_0 = N(20,4)$). Dennis equates the expert prior with the null hypothesis, when in fact, the Bayesian would also be testing the same null hypothesis as the frequentist. There are other, known problems with testing point null hypotheses using Bayesian inference (see Lee 1997: 124ff), notably that it is impossible to put a continuous prior probability density on a point estimate (Lee 1997: 126). However, it is possible to put a prior probability density on a very small interval around the point estimate, as in μ ($\mu_0 - \epsilon, \mu_0 + \epsilon$). The data, and a properly identified prior on a point-null hypothesis would clearly have helped to identify the mining scientist as biased.

³Neither should be called adherents to “frequentism” or “Bayesianism”. These terms conjure up visions of religion and politics (pick your favorite “ism”), neither of which has a place in objective modernist or postmodernist science.

Lewis and Berry 1994, Samaniego and Reneau 1994, Hill 1995, Robbins 1995, Moore 1997, Gopalan and Berry 1998). It makes sense for ecologists to adopt the same degree of pluralism. I suggest that ecologists adopt good statistical practice and use whatever method is appropriate to the question ($P(\text{data} | H)$ or $P(H | \text{data})?$) — frequentist, exact, likelihood, information-theoretic, or Bayesian.

Statistical education for ecologists

Dennis argues that statistics is a post-calculus subject, and therefore all ecologists should have one year of calculus prior to entry into graduate school, wherein they should take a standard “math-stat” course in statistical theory. In principle I agree, but I suspect that this blanket prescription would not accomplish very much. “Real” undergraduate calculus generally is poor preparation for anything other than the follow-on, advanced calculus courses and undergraduates do not readily transfer their calculus skills to other courses (e.g., ecology, physics, statistics).

Statistics (and mathematics) is neither truth nor science, rather, it is a specialized language that has been developed to speak about science. Statistical education (I explicitly avoid the term “training”, which, as Orr [1992] has pointed out, is what we do to animals) therefore should be about understanding the language of statistics, and understanding what limitations that language places on our understanding and interpretation of scientific results. Of course, to develop that understanding, it helps to know what statistics are, how they are used, how they are interpreted, and why society reveres them when it tells us what we want to know, and disparages them otherwise (contrast the front section of any issue of *USA Today* with Huff’s classic book *How to lie with statistics* [1954]). Substitute “ecologists” for “society” in the last sentence, and we have the kernel of statistical education for ecologists. This has been broadly recognized by statisticians, who have developed curricula addressing these goals not only narrowly within statistics classes, but also across disciplinary boundaries, at both high school and university levels (e.g., Mosteller 1988, Cobb and Moore 1997, Nolan and Speed 1999, Roberts et al. 1999). Ecologists need to catch up to this trend, not form a rear-guard protecting the gates of a decaying castle. We also

need this education so that we know how to provide unbiased, objective information to the individuals and groups we have charged with making ecological and environmental policy decisions. Otherwise, we will have nothing left to study.

Acknowledgments

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RESPONSE TO MCCULLOCH AND ELLISON

Brian Dennis
Department of Fish and Wildlife
and
Division of Statistics
University of Idaho
Moscow ID 83844-1136 USA

I appreciate the comments of Charles E. McCulloch and Aaron M. Ellison, but I take issue with the points they raise.

CEM states that “Bayesians do test hypotheses and do calculate quantities very similar to (and in many ways *better* than) confidence intervals, p-values, and standard errors.” I did not claim that Bayesians do not calculate quantities analogous to confidence intervals and standard errors; in fact, I calculated some of those Bayesian things in the paper (p-values, of course, are forbidden to Bayesians because of the likelihood principle). The concern I have raised is that such quantities calculated by Bayesians contain their subjective beliefs and are thereby unconvincing to a skeptical observer. Saying that the Bayesian quantities are better does not make them better.

CEM states: “To say that 'Bayesian statistics provides conclusions in the face of incomplete data' is to obfuscate the fact that frequentists always use incomplete data.” It is not clear what he means here: perhaps that frequentists do not trust the “data” represented by their beliefs? When frequentists use incomplete data, which to them often means low sample size, a proper analysis informs them and anyone else of the limits to our knowledge of the subject at hand. Is this not a virtue? The Bayesian and frequentist analyses differ the most when data are incomplete.

CEM claims (after describing a tough, long-standing problem in estimation arising from a rogish likelihood function): “The Bayesian approach, together with modern computing power, straightforwardly handles this problem, even in small and moderately sized samples.” This gets at one of the main reasons for the recent attraction to Bayesian methods in ecology: when the information contained in data about an unknown quantity is spotty, the Bayesian approaches give “answers,” whereas the frequentist approaches merely indicate that the information contained in the data about the unknown quantity is spotty. There is absolutely no question that the reader's prior beliefs make great “smoothers” that can tame the most wrinkled likelihoods. The problem is, so do mine. Bayesians “handle” these problems, but do they do it convincingly?

CEM agrees with me on the difficulties of specifying prior distributions, the “Achilles' heel” of Bayesian statistics, according to him (and those difficulties should not be minimized; see for instance Anderson 1998). A more fundamental criticism I raised, though, concerns our overall lack of guidance about how to do convincing science under Bayesian rules. This includes problems beyond specification of priors, such as how to evaluate models (for instance, goodness of fit) under the likelihood principle. The knee is the Achilles' heel of the leg, so to speak.

According to CEM: “... prior distributions sometimes capture bona fide expert opinion, not just *personal* beliefs and are a synthesis of data and experience.” I absolutely agree. But how are we to know when the priors are not personal? It is precisely here, in the formation of an individual's opinion, where the postmodern critique of science scores a *touché*. Any given expert's opinion is too easily deconstructed. An expert says that 49 previous studies indicate that dietary supplement A reduces the risk of health threat B? What about the 1 methodologically correct study that the expert omitted, which indicates the opposite (and which was not funded by the dietary

supplement industry)? What possible relevance does that expert's opinion have to the results of the data at hand? Science works because it is a process by which many admittedly biased investigators can achieve standardization and reliability. Nature is the referee.

Resource management in the face of scant information, such as the conservation problem posed by CEM, is an area in which I fear the Bayesian approaches could do major damage. The scientific problems in this area are politicized enough; any scientific signal in the data risks being obscured by the noise over beliefs and utilities. For instance, the recent Bayesian “prospective analysis” in the Plan for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses (PATH), which recommended, in the face of scant evidence, breaching dams as the best method to recover the dwindling stocks of salmon in the Snake River, did not enhance the credibility of science in the public arena (see Mann and Plummer 2000).

I have not blamed Bayesians for the ills of postmodern society and the ignorance of science by the general populace, as CEM implies. Bayesian statistics for the most part has yet to be discovered by either society's special interests or postmodern scholars. I have commented instead on the apparent similarities of their world views.

CEM says, to my call for ecologists to take mathematical statistics, “... get with the program.” I say: hear, hear. Of course, a probability and mathematical statistics course sequence is standard for statistics minors (and majors) at University of Idaho, Cornell, and scores if not hundreds of other colleges and universities. I suspect, though, that CEM paints too rosy a picture of ecological statistics education at Cornell. For instance, as of fall 2000, Cornell undergraduate biology majors (which includes “ecology and environmental biology” as an area of emphasis) are required to take “two semesters of approved college mathematics courses, including one semester of calculus,” according to the Cornell online catalogue. For most biology students that calculus course is, unless Cornell biology students are very different from those in the rest of the USA, a one semester survey course (“Math 106” at Cornell). Unfortunately, the minimal prerequisite listed at Cornell for the probability and mathematical statistics courses is the second semester of a real calculus sequence (“Math 111” and “Math 112” at Cornell); around the nation the more common prerequisite for math-stat is a *third* semester of calculus (multi-variable calculus is needed for multivariate distributions). Thus, Cornell undergraduate biology majors, like biology majors all over the USA, are *structurally* unprepared for ever being able to understand statistics. Graduate ecology students, of course, generally reflect undergraduate biology preparation and cannot take math-stat without taking at least a year to remedy undergraduate calculus deficiencies. While some farsighted Cornell grad students in “Ecology and Evolutionary Biology” no doubt elect to minor in statistics, I would be surprised if that route can be accurately described as “popular.” In reality, the standard parade of pre-calculus statistical methods courses beckons to ecology graduate students at Cornell (“Biometry 601-602-603-604”) as it does everywhere else.

The comments of AME are confusing and unclear. At times, he misrepresents what I wrote in the paper.

The first two sentences of AME's second paragraph (“Scientists construct convincing explanations...”) paraphrase the nutshell definition of science I presented. I am glad we agree here.

However, AME goes on to say that “... because there is a diversity of reasons that we become scientists, we approach that truth in many ways”, citing Feyerabend. This sentence illustrates a postmodern argumentative technique: the use of vague statements with sliding meanings. Just what is he talking about here? Scientist A uses ultraviolet light, scientist B uses radio waves, scientist C uses auspices from chicken sacrifices? Sure, we are scientists for different

reasons, but good scientists check most of their baggage at the door of the laboratory, and use practices *designed to eliminate sociology as a possible explanation of the results*.

AME misrepresents my paper by stating that I advocate “straight-jacketing ourselves to one method.” I have never advocated that science be restricted to one statistical method (is that the straight jacket he means?). Rather, I have raised questions as to whether *Bayesian* statistical methods are firmly rooted in, and motivated by, the scientific method. I welcome developments in statistics that lead to improvements in science (for instance, information criteria for model selection, bootstrapping, generalized linear models, and survival models, among others, are some statistical developments in the past 30 years that have altered the scientific landscape), and I would welcome new developments that could help build a logical and persuasive Bayesian science.

AME's footnoted lesson in the taxonomy of postmodern subgroups is a diversion and does not address the points I raised. AME's definition of “postmodern” is a narrow one by contemporary popular or scholarly usage (Koertge 1998). It suffices that those humanities scholars who seek to portray science as essentially sociological call themselves postmoderns (Forman 1997), and I believe most readers of my paper have a clear idea of who and what I was talking about. Also, it is on the surface patently absurd to call Einstein a relativist and Bayesians objectivists without clarification or justification. Muddy waters, indeed.

AME's description of statistics as “... a language used to interpret another language (science) to learn about truth and explain error” is vague and uninformative. Language? Is this meant as a metaphor, or more? Certainly statistics and science share some characteristics with languages, but certainly they are not literally languages. In the next sentence, the meaning of “language” slides around: “As a plethora of human languages enriches our social lives, so a multiplicity of statistical languages can enrich our understanding of science and bring us closer to reality.” What are we to make of this as an argument for Bayesian statistics? Of course new statistical methods can enrich science, but it does not necessarily follow that Bayesian statistics will do so. Bayesian statistics must stand or fall on its merits; science will not admit it to practice simply on an affirmative action/diversity appeal.

AME claims that “... subsequent ossification of hypothetico-deductivist methods in ecology shares much with the spread of gospel by religious disciples blindly following their master,” and that “...but in many (most?) instances it [*the hypothetico-deductive falsificationist method*] is applied post-hoc to ideas conceived inductively and tested with experiments deliberately designed to address the favored, 'alternative' hypothesis.” AME leaves these accusations completely unsubstantiated.

AME's claim that I do not consider induction to be science is absolute nonsense, and I challenge any reader to find such a statement in my paper. What, after all, is estimation based on a random sample? Humbug, Dr. Ellison.

AME restates an old Bayesian sound bite: “I only emphasize here that frequentist statistics answer the question 'how probable are my data, given my (null) hypothesis?' ... , whereas Bayesian inference answers the question, 'how probable is my hypothesis (null or alternatives(s)) given my data?...!'” AME does not engage my criticism of the sound bite, namely, that the Bayesian definition of “probability of a hypothesis” has no operationally consistent and convincing meaning. Moreover, the frequentist approach in AME's statement is imprecisely represented.

AME thinks that Bayesian inference “...would allow us to use effectively *unbiased* [italics his] results from previous research...” We must assume he means the use of the previous results in the analysis of new data; his statement, though, contains a vague implication that frequentists do not use previous research at all. Frequentists use previous results to design new studies.

Frequentists, however, when analyzing *new* data do not presume to decide *which* old results are unbiased enough to be mixed into the inferences; frequentists let a new data set speak for itself.

AME: “Frequentist statistics ... are not well-suited for prediction and inference.” Huh? The Twentieth Century is a monument to frequentist prediction and inference, from manufacturing quality control to vaccine & drug clinical trials to agriculture improvement experiments. We built this city on Neyman and Pearson.

AME misses the point of my “cooked” example involving the copper concentration. To AME, the mining company investigator is “clearly biased.” Who is AME to say who is biased and who is not? If one ignores for a moment the loonier aspects of postmodern “science studies,” one can acknowledge a serious current of scholarship (Kitcher 1998 calls it the “marginalized middle”) which indicts many scientists as biased in their individual and collective behavior toward the subject and toward other scientists. Just which investigators, then, should be allowed to use their prior distributions? Frequentists have an easy and reassuring answer: no one. Science's successes are rooted in the *process* of systematically discounting individual and collective biases, and the frequentist methods have been highly useful toward that end. We have yet to learn how Bayesian approaches could enhance the *process*.

AME misrepresents my mining company example as primarily a hypothesis test; a cursory reading will show that I compared frequentist confidence intervals and Bayesian highest probability regions.

AME suggests that “...ecologists adopt good statistical practice and use whatever method is appropriate to the question ... frequentist, exact, likelihood, information-theoretic, or Bayesian.” A minor detail: exact and information-theoretic methods are frequentist (i.e. their justification is based on sample space probability). The major problem with such pluralism is our lack of guidance concerning the Bayesian approach. AME does not attempt to inform us just when Bayesian methods are appropriate, and why. Bayesians themselves claim that Bayesian and frequentist methods are logically incompatible, and that frequentist methods are illogical, with the consequence that the entire statistical practice should be a Bayesian one (start with Lindley 1990). Bayesian research needs to focus on basic questions of scientific method: we need a Bayesian philosophy of science (such as has been constructed by Mayo 1996 for frequentist statistics) that will be reassuring to practicing scientists on matters of quality, error, reliability, and repeatability. As it stands, Bayesian philosophy smacks of scientific relativism, with different observers finding different results in the same data.

AME's vague suggestions for statistics education (“... to know what statistics are, how they are used, how they are interpreted, and why society reveres them...”) are fine for nonscientists. Unfortunately, such watered-down pre-calculus courses, based on trendy textbooks that stress data analysis over inferential concepts (that require probability and calculus) are *by themselves* woefully inadequate for scientists. To ecologists-in-training, I warn that AME's suggestions condemn the trainee to a lifetime of insecurity and incompetency in a subject of central importance to the theories and practices of ecology.

To summarize: my two major points were not addressed by either commentator.

First, we do not yet have an adequate description of a Bayesian scientific method. What we have are detailed descriptions of how a Bayesian can make a computer hum with MCMC calculations, with “the probability of a hypothesis” emerging from the millions of generated random numbers. A Bayesian can do it, but a frequentist can't, goes the claim. Unfortunately, the probability of a hypothesis, along with highest probability regions, and all the other entities obtained from posterior distributions, have no meaning except in the sense of the investigator's

personal beliefs—precisely what is enjoined in convincing scientific practice. We do not yet know how to map the Bayesian's analyses to the scientist's task of building convincing arguments. Such a map exists for frequentist analyses (see Mayo 1996 for a rigorous modern philosophical account); indeed, that map has guided workaday science for most of the Twentieth Century.

Second, there is a curious resemblance between the Bayesians' world view and the postmodern one, in regards to science. To Bayesians and postmoderns alike, beliefs are to be accepted as data, with the strength of beliefs playing the same role as sample size in one's arguments. This resemblance has been noticed only rarely (Dennis 1996, Bunge 1996), but is striking enough to cause this observer at least to wonder why Bayesian approaches have not been embraced wholesale by postmoderns (along with New Age shamans, creation scientists, and tobacco company scientists). Perhaps the mathematical difficulty of Bayesian statistics marks it as a tool used by Euro-male techno-hegemonists to exclude cultures with alinear, empirically transgressive consciousnesses (Sokal 1996). Nonetheless, if the Bayesians and postmoderns could ever live through an awkward first date, I predict it would be a match made in heaven.

In conclusion: data are precious, beliefs are cheap. Before the scientific community adopts Bayesian methods wholesale, would someone, anywhere, please answer the following question: what is the logic in mixing data and beliefs? Why dilute the Rothschild with Boone's Farm?

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